Will Israel attack Iran?

It looks as if Netanyahu is going to present Obama with an ultimatum tomorrow in regards to Iran. Frankly, it comes as no surprise to those who are closely following the events in the Middle East.

I spent last week in Israel as part of a delegation and met with Israeli and Palestinian officials. It was not the stalled peace process which was on top of the agenda but the possibility of a nuclear Iran. Israel is acutely aware of the complexity and severity of the situation. A military strike is considered to be highly risky and the Arab Spring makes it even more unpredictable and explosive.

But the bottom line is that a nuclear Iran is simply unacceptable. It is no option for Netanyahu’s government.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of the regime in Teheran are regarded as an existential threat to the state of Israel. Not because many believe they would use them, in fact that is unlikely, but the possibility that they will pass on their know-how or trigger an unstoppable arms race in the region. The strategic power balance would drastically shift and change. That, too, is perceived as an existential threat.

It leaves Netanyahu’s government with little option and he is increasingly under pressure, especially from Barak’s quarter, to deal with the problem. Iran is a master of survival under isolation, which is why sanctions are most likely not going to work and affect the civilian population more than the potency of the regime.

Containment and appeasement policy allowed Iran’s arch enemy Saddam to play the international community for over 12 years. Netanyahu does not have the time. In fact, time is running out for him rapidly. Israel must act soon, decisively, and precisely.

A military strike against Iran will not necessarily result in a full-scale war. It is possible that Israel will successfully take out strategic targets, vital for developing nuclear weapons, and thus effectively destroy or at least compromise Iran’s nuclear programme for years.

But Israel is realistic enough to understand that Iran is not an isolated case. The conflict could easily escalate and spill over to other countries, destabilising the entire region. Iran has been fighting Israel through surrogates ever since the Revolution in 1979 and its firm grip on Hezbollah and Hamas is an important factor in the equation.

One Israeli commentator went so far as to predict a Blitz-like attack on Tel Aviv in case of a military strike against Iran. But even under these bleak predictions he concluded that Iran must be dealt with. His opinion mirrored the consensus from across the political spectrum.

Israel will rather strike with great risk and might be not as successful as it wishes to be than doing nothing. Netanyahu is not the Prime Minister under whose leadership Iran is going to go nuclear. He is also not the Prime Minister to test whether Iran is a rational or messianic, apocalyptical actor. The stakes are simply too high.

If necessary, Israel will act unilaterally. It has the required capabilities and has done so many times in the past. Israel will not put the existence of its state in the hands of a US President who visited the country not once since his election. When it comes to its survival Israel trusts itself – and only itself.

An attack on Iran is inevitable. It is not a question of if but when.

Rwanda – A Scar on The Consciousness of The International Community

When the darkest chapter in the history of Rwanda began on April 6th, 1994 the country had already been in a state of civil war for four years. What turned it into the fastest killing-spree in modern times was the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira. While at the time, the government in Kigali blamed the RPF for shooting down the helicopter, it is now widely accepted that it was an internal conspiracy within the Hutu community to unleash a tidal wave of hatred against the Tutsi.

The question is whether it would have been possible to foreseen and prevent the mass-slaughter or at least stop it when it was already under way. The idea that the international community was impotent in the face of evil must be wholeheartedly rejected, as it relativises the moral responsibility of those who decided to become a silent accomplice rather than engage in a robust and rigid response to crimes against humanity.

While nobody could have predicted such an immense loss of life, the international community ignored warnings and failed to intervene in the early stages of the annihilation campaign, thus fatally violating its responsibilities by endowing the genocidaires with a blanco check for killing with impunity. The genocide was not only the darkest chapter in the history of Rwanda; it was also one of the darkest chapters in the history of the international community.

France was arming and training the Rwandan government forces, despite the nature of the regime and danger of an escalation of violence. It is beyond question that Mitterrand’s government ignored the increased radicalisation of Habyarimana’s regime for the sake of France’s national interests in the region. This policy was a factor in the equation which made the genocide happen, although there is no indication that the French supported the genocidal ideology per se.

The racial vendetta pursued against the Tutsi had been most prominently summarised in the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu”. A report by Human Rights Watch, published in 1993, indicated that Hutu extremists had already began to enthusiastically carrying them out. The findings were in line with a report issued by the CIA the same year, which concluded that a large-scale atrocity was in the making and “the worst case scenario would involve one-half million people dying”.

Therefore, the international community was aware of the military training and ideological warfare against the Tutsi long before the genocide started and was closely involved in the Arusha Peace Accords, which suggested a power-sharing government between Hutu and Tutsi. But since the Accords were overly in favour of the Tutsi, it should have come to no surprise that many Hutu were deeply suspicious of the deal and especially the extremists among them felt they had everything to lose and nothing to gain.

Even though it might not have been possible in the first one or two weeks to determine whether or not genocide was underway, it was beyond doubt that crimes against humanity were committed on a day-to-day basis. While before the genocide took place the situation in Rwanda could have been classified as a two-sided civil war, it rapidly became apparent who had the upper hand in the conflict after the President’s death and killed soldiers and civilians indiscriminately, turning it into a one-sided mass-slaughter. The international community also knew from credible sources on the ground, especially Belgian and French officials, that democratically elected government members had been assassinated by Hutu extremists, most prominently the moderate Prime Minister.

In his briefings to the UN headquarters, General Dallaire already spoke of crimes against humanity four days after the killing had started, although he did not use the term genocide until the end of the month. But whether or not and when and where the “g-word” was actually used seems to be insignificant, given that a mass-scale atrocity was the undeniable reality in Rwanda at the time. That should have been sufficient enough for the international community to engage in principled humanitarian interventionism in the face of evil.

The most fatal decision which enabled the genocidaires to kill over such a long period of time without any serious, external threat was the mishandling over UNAMIR. Instead of reinforcing the unit, as requested by General Dallaire, the US primarily focused on re-launching the Arusha Peace Accords and negotiating a new cease-fire between the two parties. Even worse, the US and UN officials threatened to pull out peace-keeping forces altogether as a punishment for non-compliance. Unfortunately, that was exactly what the perpetrators wanted.

This became brutally apparent when Hutu extremists kidnapped and ruthlessly killed ten Belgian UN blue helmets. What had happened in Mogadishu just a few years ago was still fresh in the minds of US policy-makers and the American public. The Hutu extremists knew that and, shockingly, the US allowed them to exploit their weakness and followed the request of the Belgians for a UN withdrawal, instead of standing up to the unspeakable horror committed.

Reinforcing UNAMIR or sending Special Forces from abroad could have made the difference between life and death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, who were left to the mercy of their killers when the powerful nations of the world decided to put their national interests above all else.

In the end, it was not the West, the French Operation Turquoise or Dallaire’s UNAMIR (or UNAMIR II) which halted the genocide, but the troops of Kagame’s RPF. After 800.000 innocent souls lost their lives, the Rwandans finally saved themselves.

The myth about the European Union’s opposition to the Iraq war

People seem to forget, or rather want to forget, that most of the European countries supported the war in Iraq. In fact, only France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Slovenia vocally opposed it. 17 of the 27 member states backed the invasion, while five countries remained (more or less) neutral.

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The evidence

On January 30th , 2003 the so called ‘Ltter of the Eight’ was published in the Wall Street Journal. It was signed by the governments of the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

The text of the letter in its entirely.

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On February 6th, 2003 the ‘Letter of the Eight’ was followed by the ‘Vilnius Letter’. It was signed by the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia. Croatia – all members of the European Union now.

The text of the letter in its entirely.

These two documents alone prove the support for the invasion of Iraq by 14 of the now 27 member states. As mentioned before, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and Slovenia were against it. What about the other eight countries?

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The Netherlands

The Netherlands neither signed the ‘Letter of the Eight’ nor the ‘Vilnius Letter’ , in order to avoid alienating the other Benelux countries. However, the Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende publicly endorsed the invasion of Iraq. On March 20, 2003 he confirmed that the Dutch government politically supports military action against Saddam’s regime:

Excerpt from statement of PM Balkenende, March 20th, 2003:

Peace is a fragile thing. This becomes very clear when one regime persistently pursues the path of threats and terror. The international community must then patiently uphold international agreements and try to eliminate the threat.

Our patience should be very great, but not boundless. For this would jeopardise the foundations on which law and peace are built.

Saddam Hussein presents just such a major threat to peace and the rule of law. Virtually every country in the world accepts this.

(…)

The United Nations first called on Saddam Hussein to disarm twelve years ago. For twelve years the international community has worked patiently and persistently to find a solution. The Security Council adopted seventeen resolutions to secure his cooperation.

Last November, Resolution 1441 gave him a final chance. It demanded his immediate cooperation, otherwise serious consequences would follow. And once again Saddam refused to listen. We have done everything possible to find a solution through the United Nations. But that road came to a dead end this week, after 12 years of joint endeavours.

In recent days many people have highlighted the importance of the international legal order. And rightly so. But defending the legal order also means that those who have persistently and shamelessly broken international law must not be allowed to get away with it.

The Netherlands has therefore given political support to the military action against Saddam Hussein. Freedom and security – including for the people of Iraq – is the highest aim.

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The Republic of Ireland

Speaking in the Dáil on May 28th, 2003, in regard to the invasion and the use of Shannon Airport by the US military, the Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern said:

“We are not going to apologise for any small role we may have played in helping to remove a dictator who made his people suffer for 20 years, carried out horrific acts and didn’t care about democracy. He is gone now, and thank God for that.”

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Greece

The Greek government did not send troops to Iraq, but however allowed the US military to use Souda Bay,Crete naval base and Greek airports.

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The politically neutral countries – Austria, Sweden, Finland, Malta and Cyprus

All of these countries are politically neutral. They are not members of NATO and none of them signed the ‘Letter of the Eight’ or the ‘Vilnius Letter’. However, they did not publicly reject the Iraq war (Ireland is actually neutral as well, but still endorsed the invasion).

Austria

Austria tried its best to maintain its neutrality throughout the conflict with Iraq. However on February 14, 2002, the Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel said about Iraq:

“The position of Austria is unchanged. We see the government of Iraq, the leaders of Iraq, as a dangerous group.”

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Sweden

Sweden supported Resolution 1441 in the UN Security Council, calling on Saddam to comply. They also offered humanitarian aid in the aftermath of the war, as it was not possible for neutral Sweden to participate in any military action. The country’s neutrality was also the reason why the Swedish government tried to avoid a public break-up with the anti-war countries, such as France and Germany.

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Finland

In Finland there was the so called ‘Iraq-gate’. Anneli Jäätteenmäki celebrated a narrow election victory, after accusing former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen of infringing Finland’s neutrality by giving the impression Finland was part of the coalition against Iraq. She later resigned over these allegations but rejected any wrong doing. The country never publicly opposed the war.

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Malta and Cyprus

The countries were members of the so called ‘Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries’ until 2004 and therefore neutral in regard to the Iraq conflict.

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The information is available on the internet. You only have to find it. It was while researching for this article that I found no website or blog provides the vital documents and numbers in a coherent way.

Why we cannot trust the regime in Teheran – Lessons to learn from the Iranian Revolution.

Today, the Islamic Republic of Iran is seen by most Western governments as one of the greatest present threats to peace and stability in the Middle East – and rightly so. The country’s refusals to give up its nuclear ambitions, sponsoring international terrorism and severe human rights abuses have isolated Iran on the world stage. Especially since Ahmadinejad took over power from Khatami in 2005, the forces of conservatism have dominated the country’s internal and external policies and Iran’s rhetoric against Israel is arguably as aggressive and extreme as never before.

The birth of the Islamic Republic clearly was the beginning of the end.  It turned Iran, a country that in the past was one of the West’s closest allies in the region, into a deadly enemy and pariah state. Before the US even had time to properly think through how to approach the new, theocratic regime in Teheran, an event took place in November 1979, which had a devastating effect on US-Iranian relations up to the present day.

President Carter had granted political asylum to his former ally, the Shah, to seek medical treatment for terminal cancer. This led to outrage in Iran and a violent student revolt ended with hijacking the American embassy. Early diplomatic talks failed and Khomeini began to use the situation for his own political ends. This was related to a war which broke out behind the scenes between the reformists and ultra-conservatives. The former believed that ‘Republic’ was the key word, while the latter were determined to re-build society on ‘Islamic’ principles.

The hardliners around Khomeini saw the hostage-taking as a legitimate, ideological act of aggression against an hostile, hegemonic power, but the moderates in his interim government rejected it, as it breached every, single international rule of diplomacy. They argued that while all Americans should be expelled from Iran, keeping them against their will was unacceptable. They understood that realism dictates having at least some minimum, political ties with the US was necessary to avoid isolation on the international stage. But Khomeini was at the peak of his power and Bazargan’s government had no other choice but to resign.

The ultra-conservatives were now in a position to initiate the second, more radical part of the revolution. In the referendum on the constitution, which took place in December 1979, the Iranians voted by a large margin for a constitution in the firm grip of the clerics, which gave supremacy to religious authority over anything else. The head of this new, clerical regime was Khomeini himself – the Supreme Leader. The consequences of the power struggle between ultra-conservatives and moderates have continued over the years.

The new system, with clerics as the highest authority in the country, changed Iranian society profoundly, as well as affecting Iran’s relation with the outside world. As much as many Arab states dislike the regime in Tehran, they could no longer ignore and dismiss it, as it was determined to spread its sinister ideology across the region. Examples are Iran’s influence in Sudan, relations with Palestine’s Hamas, or the carefully constructed alliance with parts of Afghanistan and the Shia population in Iraq, which played a major role in destabilising the country in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. But no other country was more affected by the ideological impact in the post-revolutionary period than Lebanon. With the help of Iran, Hezbollah – an Islamist terrorist group – was born, which still terrorises the region and kills innocent civilians on a regular basis.

Therefore, it is not surprising at all that the idea of Iran as a hostage-taking, terror-sponsoring crime regime is still deeply entrenched in the minds of Western governments. Rafsanjani’s and especially Khatami’s attempts to re-integrate Iran into the international community – as for instance via the ‘dialogue of civilisations’ -  were constantly and indeed successfully undermined by those opposed to change, most notably the Supreme Leader himself. The effects of the Iranian Revolution were indeed seismic – in the most negative way imaginable, causing all that is wrong with Iran today.

Should the West allow such a regime to acquire nuclear capabilities? I do not think so.

Why I will join the Labour Party

Being an independent has many advantages, especially for a centrist like myself. Most importantly, it lets you sit above the tribal fray and base your decisions purely on convictions and principles. You can speak your mind without caring what others might think about what you feel or have to say. But the downside to it is that people often call you a hypocrite and accuse you of not standing up for what you believe in – fighting a corner – and instead take the lazy way out.

It is a fair point.

As a result, I thought about joining a political party for several months – Labour or Conservatives. I was courted by the Tories much more than by Labour but both sides presented good and strong arguments, which made it immensely difficult for me.

I was impressed by Cameron’s leadership over Libya and I support many of the coalition’s cuts. But after all Cameron is not a neo-conservative and has probably only slightly more interventionist blood in his veins than Ed Miliband. The cuts are right but too fast and too deep.

As for Labour, I strongly disagree with the direction the party has taken since Tony Blair was ousted by a ruthless coup, initiated by the Brownian cronies, and I consider the leadership’s continues attempts to trash and bury his legacy as not just fundamentally wrong but appalling and disgraceful. The Brownites are still spilling their poison, lowering the standards of the political culture and making the current Labour leadership as intellectually exclusive as ever.

But here comes the point.

New Labour’s record is worth fighting for. Not just the domestic achievements – minimum wage, high employment, tough on crime, pro-business – but also the promotion of a liberal interventionist foreign policy, which saved hundreds of thousands of innocent lives on the Balkan, in Sierra Leone and Iraq.

That is why I decided to join Red Ed’s Labour – not out of enthusiasm but strategic considerations. I have to admit the fact that Owen Jones asked me to become a Tory was yet another incentive to do exactly the opposite.

Ultimately, it is best to take on the ultra-left from inside. Otherwise you are just another sleazy, opportunistic Tory, whose opinion is not worth listening to. Be warned. I will not be an easy Labourite and lurk on the very right- wing periphery of the party.

All I have to offer is honesty.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s influence in the Middle East has been greatly undermined and its policy has changed in emphasis and intensity. While during the clash between the two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – the Middle East was part of its ideological battlefield, Russia nowadays often merely reacts to US policy in the region, after shrinking from a superpower to a middle power.

The post-Soviet era was marked by a struggle between the Russian Atlanticists and Eurasians. The former were in favour of a closer partnership with the West, in order to accelerate Russia’s democratic transformation. But the latter considered China, India and the Middle East as the country’s natural allies and rejected a more pro-Western policy, as it is the case up to the present.

After the September 11th, 2001 atrocities in the US, most Western countries offered their support and embraced a policy of counter-terrorism in the Middle East. Russia on the contrary, despite its rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and its problems with Chechnya, has been an obstacle rather than an asset in the fight against global Islamic extremism.

Russia’s policy in the Middle East is inconsistent and ambivalent. Firstly, Russia’s goal is to oppose, sabotage and boycott US foreign policy in the region, in order to counter American hegemony.  This is mostly achieved through diplomatic channels, as for instance by vetoing US resolutions in the UN Security Council, or through arms trades with rogue states, as in case of Iran and Iraq.

Secondly, Russia’s Middle East policy is strongly shaped by strategic calculations, especially in respect to Chechnya. Arguably, no other security concern influences Moscow’s terrorism and Middle East policy more than the situation on the northern Caucasus. Against this background, Russia sought membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference and was successfully granted observer status. The idea behind it was to gain de facto immunity from criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya.

Thirdly, Russia is determined to profit from economic partnerships in the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country no longer self-restrained itself in its arms sales to the region as long as financial arrangements were beneficial for the Russian defence industry.

Although Russia and the United States arguably have a common enemy in radical Islamism, the former nevertheless deliberately undermines the strategy of the latter. Further, although Putin deploys a zero-tolerance policy against Islamic extremism at home, he maintains close relationships, mostly because of political and economic considerations, with countries in the Middle East, which represent similar ideologies.

Russia’s Decline in the Middle East            

From the mid-1950s onwards to its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet Union played an essential part in providing the weaponry of many Arab states. Almost 90 per cent of military equipment in Syria and Libya was coming from the Soviet market. For the country, this was one way of protecting its influence in opposition to its rival, the US, and to help shaping Middle East policy in its own national, strategic interests.

But even during the Cold War, especially towards the end, the Soviet Union was not in a position to compete with the military and financial aid offered by the US. Many of the Arab states became increasingly aware of its domestic economic problems, and sided with the Americans, as for instance Egypt, which cut all ties with the Soviet Union in 1972, and instead turned on the US to enhance its military capabilities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was a fatal blow. The country’s influence in the region significantly suffered and the newly emerging Russia found itself in a disastrous position.  Now incapable of proving the Arab states with large-scale arms sales, it lost almost all of its allies, except of Iran and Iraq, which were boycotted by the US and most Western countries for political reasons. But even these two countries escaped Russian influence more and more, as they were aware of Moscow’s desperate dependence on strategic and economic partnerships in the region and used it for their own advantages.

As a result, Russia’s policy in the Middle East changed from an offensive to a defensive one. Moscow is now primarily concerned with countering US hegemony, containing Islamic extremism on the northern Caucasus and enhancing the country’s influence through economic channels.

The Russian- Iranian Relationship

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis, the US cut all ties with the Islamic Republic, which has become the leading anti-American force in the region. Up to the present day, the US has not opened an embassy on Iranian soil again.

Russia, on the other hand, has been a long and traditional partner for the Iranians. Since 1995, Russia has  also been Iran’s sole partner in the nuclear field and Iran is the third largest importer of Russian weapons, after India and China. Russia signed a deal with the Islamic Republic, worth $800 million, over the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant, for which they sold reactors and turbines.

After it was revealed in 2002 that Iran runs a secret nuclear programme, the country has come under more and more scrutiny from the international community, in particular the US and its Western allies, as many question that Iran plans to use it for peaceful means only. This concern is fuelled by Ahmadinejad’s repeated threats against Israel and some of Iran’s Arab neighbours.

Several UNSCRs have already been issued against the Islamic Republic. UNSCR 1737 was passed in December 2006 and prohibited financial and technical assistance for “Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water and ballistic missile programmes”. Four years later, the country was still in breach of previous resolutions and failed to cooperate with the IAEA inspectors. The Security Council imposed further sanctions on the regime and again called on Teheran to completely suspend its enrichment activities.

Despite supporting some of the diplomatic manoeuvres against Iran, Russia has not significantly altered or downgraded its relationship with Teheran and is arguably in breach of the international community’s sanctions against the Islamic Republic. For instance, Putin finally agreed in 2005 to provide the Bushehr plant with Russian nuclear fuel.

The reason for Russia to maintain close ties with Iran at such a high price are threefold . Firstly, Russia and Iran perceive US hegemony and Western influences as a common threat. Both were particular concerned by the Bush administration’s attempt to expand NATO’s sphere of influence on the Balkans and the Caucasus, areas of strategic importance for both Moscow and Teheran

Secondly, Russia is struggling to contain Islamic extremism at its backdoor, especially in Chechnya, which is why Moscow needs allies in the Islamic world. In return for supporting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Islamic Republic has, at least officially, refrained from actively supporting the Chechen rebel, as any Middle Eastern government which seeks Moscow’s support must either side with their struggle against Chechen separatists or, at a minimum, not protest.

Thirdly, Russia’s alliance with Iran has been highly beneficial and proves that Moscow is prepared to risk its relationship with the West, in particular the US, for economic reasons.

The Russian- Iraq Relationship

As with Iran, economic considerations and political opposition to the US guided Russian policy toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This became strongly apparent in the run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. At the time, sanctions were crumbling and the no-fly zone over the northern and southern part of Iraq was no longer working. Furthermore, Saddam’s regime was able to smuggle prohibited items in and out of the country through its neighbouring borders.

Consequently, the US and its allies pushed for new and stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council, aimed at restoring the no fly zone over the Kurdish region and to seal off the borders to stop illegal trade. This however was strongly opposed by Russia. Moscow was the leading force in trying get sanctions lifted and Putin’s government threatened to veto any UNSCR of that kind.

As the UK’s former ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, recalled “Russia had its own direct relationship with Iraq and was talking with Iraq probably more than any other country”.  He also stated that Iraq’s debt to Russia “was in many billions of dollars resulting from the Iran/Iraq war purchases” and the country “wanted sanctions to be lifted so they could get some of their money back”. At some point, the US and UK even discussed to pay parts of the $8 billion owed to Moscow to gain the country’s support.

Other economic reasons for Russia to oppose a stronger sanction regime and the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam offered them lucrative contracts in return and Moscow wanted to preserve the cashing-in from the UN’s oil-for-food-programme.

But the country also opposed the US-led policy towards Iraq for political considerations. The reasons given by Moscow were highly dubious. While on the one hand, Putin stated that he opposed the war in Iraq because of the strong opposition of Russia’s Muslim, he never displayed much concern about their opinion on Russian policy toward Chechnya.

Another piece of evidence which suggests that the Putin administration actively tried to wage public opinion against the US is that many of the 20,000 protesters, who went on the streets against the war, were given favours in return.

Russia’s relationship with Iraq is a further example of the country’s troubled Middle East policy and unlike in case of Iran, Moscow has not gained a lot from boycotting the toppling of the Baathist regime. In fact, it can be argued that Saddam, by offering Russia lucrative contracts in return to opposition to the US, influenced Russian policy as much as vice versa, which again is an indicator that Moscow’s Middle East policy is defensive rather than offensive.

Further, with Saddam gone, Russia has lost yet another ally in the region and Putin’s decision not to support the removal of Iran’s arch-enemy, also put Russia’s relationship with Teheran under strain.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East Policy

Especially on the issue of Islamic extremism, Moscow’s approach has been Janus-faced. While determined to brutally crushing down those movements at home and on the northern Caucasus, Putin’s administration at the same time maintains close ties with regimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, which represents a similar ideology.

Although Teheran has officially refrained from condemning Russia’s policy in Chechnya, Putin is playing with the devil and Iran continues support for organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. It proves where Iran’s solidarity ultimately lies. Also, despite having been granted observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference, many Arab states are still publicly condemning Russia’s approach to Chechnya. Thus, in the short-term, Moscow maybe succeeds in containing the situation on the northern Caucasus with its purpose alliances in the Middle East, but in the long-term it will hardly solves the problem.

Moreover, even though Russia experienced a limited surge of influence when the US and allies where under severe pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia failed to sustainably increase its influence in the region, and consequently Moscow’s Middle East policy remains defensive rather than offensive. Additionally, Russia did not effectively boycott and sabotage decisive policy decisions of the US and its Western allies, as for instance in case of Iraq. Also, with Saddam’s regime gone, Iran under tremendous pressure from the international community and Assad, another ally of Russia, on the brink in Syria, the country has to expect further backlashes.

The only of the three objectives Russia fulfilled was to enhance its economic partnerships in the region. Especially its support for Iran’s nuclear programme has brought in a lot of money for Moscow. In recent years, in particular under Putin’s leadership, Russia has also successfully intensified economic relationships with Israel and other Arab countries, which were not traditional trading partners of Russia.

In sum, Russia has failed to make priorities in the Middle East and got caught up in many conflicts of interest and policy dilemmas. Instead of focusing on specific goals, Moscow has often pursued opportunistic ends, resulting in inconsistent and ambivalent decision-making processes.

How much do you really know about the Iraq war?

End of page: Assessment and answers

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Your score

0 answers correct

You are a deluded peace buddy and/or tree hugger. Membership in “Stop the War Coalition” strongly recommended.

1-3 answers correct

Oh hello Peter Oborne. Or is it Noam?

4-6 answers correct

You are most likely a semi-detached Indy, Guardian or Daily Mail hack.

7-8 answers correct

7 – George W. Bush drunk; 8 – George W. Bush sober

9-10 answers correct:

You are either Tony Blair, Condi Rice or just a very well informed and obsessive political anorak.

Answers

1 c

2 d

3 a

4 a

5 d

6 b

7 b

8 d

9 b

10 c

Death-threatened for being a Blairite

Actually, it is too bizarre to be true but I am being stalked and death-threatened by Shereef Abdallah, an anti-Semitic wannabe Ed Miliband “lookalike”. He previously worked as a volunteer for Labour MP Glenda Jackson and was yesterday exposed by the excellent Martin Bright in the Jewish Chronicle.

Shereef Abdallah

Since running my political blog Julie’s Think Tank and the corresponding Twitter account, I have often got buried in waves of ad hominem attacks. Although annoying, you learn to get around it. It is part of modern communication. But never before, had I encountered anything like Mr Abdallah who previously operated under the Twitter names @Sheik74k, @LFCSheikKD and now @LFCSheik83KD.

My crime was to be a friend and supporter of Tony Blair, liberal interventionist and strong advocate of the US-led war against Iraq in 2003, a decision I often defend on social media sites, including Twitter. In Mr Abdallah’s eyes, this makes me a “warmongering, anti-Islamist, Zionist Nazi” with “no class, intellect or morals”.

About three months ago, I first got into contact with him. I did not pick a fight. It was him who intervened in a debate – a civilised one – I had with another Twitter user who strongly disagreed with me over the decision to go to war.

After Mr Abdallah made the serious allegation that the Iraq war was illegal, I politely asked him to explain his position in legal terms and in return offered to explain mine. But instead of engaging in a factual debate, he immediately started to personally insult me. Ignoring his rants, I patiently outlined the significance of UNSCR 1441 in combination with 678 and 687.

Again, Mr Abdallah refused to engage in an argument and instead began to claim I called him a “jihadi”, a remark sent to me not made by me – a small but significant difference. He then “noted and printed” my alleged insults and reported me to Holborn police. They sent him home three times, as he later admitted.

Ever since, he has been sending me aggressive and violent tweets several times per day, many of which he later deleted. According to Mr Abdallah, “Zionists cannot save me” as they “have lost every war since 1973” and indeed “no force on earth” will stop him, including Twitter and the police.

The situation escalated last month, when he turned up at my workplace demanding to see me.

So far, the most chilling death-threat I received on December 29th, 2011 when Mr Abdallah tweeted: “Julia are you still alive FFS? RIP you will be next after I end “X”, that’s a promise. Sleep tight”…“As long as I’m alive I will hound you”…”I’m going to escalate in 2012”.

While I accept Twitter cannot act upon every complaint made and in most cases their suggestion to block the user in question is sufficient to settle the dispute, I find it appalling – to say the least – that they have failed to take action against Mr Abdallah. The internet should not be a law-free zone.

But a spokeswoman from Twitter’s “Trust and Safety” department concluded that his behaviour was “not in violation of the Twitter Rules at this time” and that although they “have a policy against violent threats”, his tweets “lack[ed] the specificity to meet the criteria of an actionable threat”.

Mr Abdallah’s behaviour is now a matter for the Crown. A former Labour Press Officer reported him to the police, after he threatened to “cut his throat” and I too will contact the authorities. I am very pleased the Labour Party has responded by suspending his membership with immediate effect and both Progress and the Young Fabians have confirmed that Mr Abdallah falsely claimed to be a member of their organisations.

The clock is ticking – no time to lose in Syria and Iran

2011 was not a good year for dictators and tyrants, as Ben Ali, Mubarak and finally Gaddafi were all successfully unseated from power.

But let us not forget that many are still killing, torturing, and raping their own people – right now. Although Assad is on the brink in Syria, so far more than 6,129 innocent souls have lost their lives and the actual number is likely to be much higher.

While the UN half-masted the flag for North Korea’s ex-dictator, the international community failed to act in concert and protect the Syrian people from Assad’s crime family. It was strategic suicide on behalf of NATO to rule out intervention right from the start and at the same time an invitation for Assad’s snipers to commit mass civilian atrocities with impunity.

It is no longer a battle over freedom and democracy in Syria. It has literally become a matter of life and death.

The other country we must pay close attention to is Iran, which is currently defying the West with its quest for nuclear weapons. Under no circumstances whatsoever we should tolerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The country plans to produce 7000MW of nuclear energy by the year 2020, which will require at least seven nuclear power plants. When Saddam tried to build his dirty bomb, he already had in stock a total of more than 30 lbs of fresh Russian supplied 80% enriched uranium. One only needs to look at developments in Iran and it would appear that history is repeating itself.

How irresponsible, ignorant and naive are we?

According to the IAEA, Iran has already practically completed a front end of cycle, including conversion, enrichment and uranium mining and milling.  What if Iran enriches uranium to a level higher than 20% U-235?

In 2010, the UNSC passed a Resolution, 1929, which called on Iran to immediately suspend its enrichment activities and fully cooperate with the IAEA inspectors. Ever since, Iran has been in breach and has crossed several thresholds relevant to the development of nuclear weapons. Just two days ago, the regime reported that it produced its first nuclear fuel rod.

Iran is a serious  and profound threat to stability and peace in the region, which arguably makes it the greatest present danger per se. It undoubtedly continues to support organisations committed to destroying Israel, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas in Gaza and global jihad.

It is essential that we -  the West – understand that those regimes do not hate us because of what we do but who we are. They are fighting hard and so must we. There should be no place for death-worshipping, religious fundamentalist, barbaric, pro-terrorist and anti-Semitic regimes in our freedom-loving minds.

Should the UK join the EU Monetary Union?

When the single currency was introduced in 1999, eleven out of the fifteen European states joined the EMU. The UK however, one of the largest economies in the Union, declined to participate. The choice of whether or not joining the Euro zone was a fiercely contested issue in Britain with the government and business circles generally in favour of joining and the conservative opposition, right wing-media, and large parts of the public equally strong against participation.

Several key economic reasons were named for both in favour of and against adopting the Euro. The parties that were supportive of joining the EMU saw the single currency as a natural and further step towards the Single European Market. They argued that it would enhance the competitiveness of the UK economy and provide sustainable growth and prosperity. Furthermore, the government embraced a pro-European policy and wanted to lead the country out of isolation into the heart of European politics.

On the contrary, the opponents of the single currency argued that the Euro would undermine British national identity by replacing the Pound, and that Britain was culturally and economically closer to US business cycles. Their strongest argument against adopting the Euro was the loss of national sovereignty in terms of monetary policy, which would have largely been coordinated by the European Central Bank. The UK would not have been able to follow an independent exchange rate policy anymore with the result that it would have been impossible to adjust interest rates in times of crisis. The UK would have lost influence over its national economic agenda, since more and more macroeconomic decisions were planned to be made in Brussels. Additionally, while fiscal policy, like tax harmonisation, was not directly linked to the EMU, opponents believed that the adoption of the single currency and deeper integration in relation to the Single Market was a clear sign for an on-going convergence process.

In 1999, the Bank of England became independent which was generally seen as a positive signal for potential membership, since it mirrored one of the criteria, outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, for joining the Euro zone. However, there was also increasingly pressure to reject membership in the long term, when for example the Euro fell steadily against the Dollar and the Pound in the same year. As a result, the “Five Economic Tests”, issued by the Treasury in 1997 and which were key economic criteria for a potential British membership, became increasingly the breaking point of the debate. The tests addressed the following questions of concern:

1. Convergence: Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?

2. Flexibility: If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?

3. Investment: Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?

4. Financial Services: What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK’s financial services industry, particularly the City’s wholesale markets?

5. Growth, Stability and Employment: In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?

The problem with the test were that they were originally meant to be rather elastic but increasingly became rigid hurdles for adopting the currency. Consequently, when the Treasury issued its assessment in 2003, it concluded that the five tests were either not sufficiently met or answered, and as a result British membership in the monetary union not recommendable in the foreseeable future.

There is a high risk for the UK in joining the monetary union. Strong divergences such as the high probability of asymmetric shocks and a restricted openness to trade make it less likely and favourable for the UK to join the monetary union in the near future. In contrast to the EU, there is a much closer trading relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, some economists argue that convergence is a feature of countries that are already in monetary union; it is not something that takes place beforehand. The five criteria thus could only be accessed in the post-accession period. However, I believe that in the pre-union time a certain degree of convergence needs to be achieved first. This is currently not the case in the UK.

Under the given circumstance, the most likely future scenario is that the UK will not join the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and will continue to keep its own currency as well as independent fiscal and monetary policy. There is still the question if the EU can be really regarded as an OCA. There are still limitations of the OCA criteria, especially in times of economic crisis and further EU enlargement.

Moreover, considering the latest economic and political developments, a membership appears to be almost impossible. The bankruptcy of the Greek state has led the Euro into its deepest crisis since its adoption in 1999. Furthermore, the change of government in the UK, with the Eurosceptic Conservatives now in power, has been equal to a kiss of death to a continuous and open debate about a potential EMU entry.  As Conservative Member of Parliament Alan Duncan said “The Euro would take UK only to economic fantasy land”.