Iraq war: 10 years later we are stuck with thought-terminating clichés

38Allow me to make one thing clear in advance: this post is written from the perspective of someone who strongly supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and still maintains the same position. I am not claiming to be entirely unbiased.

That said, I always accepted, then and now, that there were legitimate reasons against the war. As with every complex foreign policy decision, different alternatives were evaluated and genuine pro and contra arguments presented for each possibility. It is a natural, democratic process and one that should be welcomed because, if we take such far-reaching decisions that have a severe impact on our own people and others, we should make sure that all opinions are represented in the process of the debate.

I have great respect for many of the people who opposed the invasion right from the start, including family members and close friends, and also for those who, over the cause of the war, shifted their standpoint from a pro-war to a contra-war position like, for instance, Professor Norman Geras.

Yes, I even understand them in a way. There were moments when I myself had severe doubts over some aspects of the invasion, although I can say in all honesty that I never came close to the point where I felt that we got it completely wrong and should have left Iraq alone. I still believe the removal of Saddam was a moral and just cause and that the positive implications outbalance the negative ones.

In particular, I had issues with several of the US-led coalition’s post-war policies, like the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the De-Ba’athification. The greatest mistake, in my view, was the American exit policy. After the surge of 2007 under the leadership of General Petraeus, it was fair to say, for the first time, that we won the peace in Iraq. But when the Obama administration pulled out too quickly and over-hastily, the situation began to deteriorate again and that was the moment we once more lost the peace in Iraq.

This brings me back to my original point about the pro and contra arguments for the invasion. The greatest issue I have with the opposition to the war is that a significant part of the anti-war movement opposed the invasion not for the right but all the wrong reasons.

In fact, very few of those who marched on the streets of London 10 years ago, had previously spoken out against the intolerable cruelties committed by Saddam’s fascist regime against his own people. Unlike, for instance Tony Blair, who already spoke about the brutal and inhumane nature of Saddam’s rule in the 1990s, long before the Bush administration took office.

Too many of those who were protesting against the war were doing it because of their own, petty politics. As Nick Cohen pointed out, the anti-war movement united the worst elements of the Left – an amalgam of Marxist Leninists, George Galloway fanboys, and radical Islamists.  Their motives were not so much rooted in the humanitarian tradition and a genuine concern for the Iraqi people, but were rather an expression of their deep-rooted anti-Western and anti-establishment sentiments.

Opposition to the war per se was a legitimate and moral position to hold. The tragedy is that the movement was hijacked by individuals with a highly suspicious agenda, who used it for their own ideological and political crusade against those who they despise.

The wellbeing of the Iraqi people was never really central to their cause.

What saddens me is that 10 years later we are basically still stuck in the same level of ignorance. Three points, in particular, are worth addressing.

First of all, as John Rentoul wrote the other day, the opinion of Iraqis is almost entirely absent from the debate, with the possible exception of the Kurds, whose position is rather well-known, as a result of a long history of suffering under Saddam’s regime. But we still know very little about the thoughts of average Iraqis. My prediction is that we would not find a clear cut set of opinion. Neither would the vast majority say that the war was a success, nor that the war was a total failure. Rather, I predict, we would get a variety of views with some arguing that, on balance, they are better off or, on balance, they are worse off.  Furthermore, I would expect the result to be different now than, let’s say, three or four years ago. Ever since the pull-out of the Americans, the situation has deteriorated again and, at the moment, Iraq is also suffering not only from internal Shia-Sunni strife, but spill-over effects from the war in Syria. In recent months, we have seen a sharp increase in terrorist attacks, as Assad’s murderous campaign allowed al-Qaida to slip back into Iraq.

The second point is that the counter-argument is also almost entirely absent from the debate. While it is, of course, rested exclusively on hypotheses, it would be wrong not to take into account the scenario of Iraq still being ruled by Saddam and the implications entailed – a consideration made by Fraser Nelson.

And finally, it is quite tragic that we still cannot have a “moderate” debate about the war in Iraq in which both sides acknowledge that they got some things wrong and some things right. For people like myself that means to admit that, while, on balance, removing Saddam was the right thing to do, we got several things terribly wrong which led to chaos and bloodshed. It is important to learn the right lessons from Iraq, especially if we are going to advocate interventions in the future. At the same time, it is of critical importance not to overlearn the lessons of Iraq. Just because we did not get everything right, does not mean that intervention is always wrong and always causes more harm than good. Several examples, such as Sierra Leone and Kosovo, have proven the opposite. The Iraq war did not discredit the notion of liberal interventionism altogether and it would only be fair of those who opposed the war to acknowledge that we, too, had genuine and legitimate reasons to support the overthrow of a totalitarian, fascist regime.

Only when we start meeting in the middle and realise that Iraq was so much more than a clear cut case, a black and white, right and wrong decision, we can do the debate justice. Apparently, 10 years were not enough, as became clear during the event organised by Huffington Post’s Mehdi Hasan the other week. Maybe, we have to wait another 20 years and leave it to the historians to have an open-minded and intellectually rigorous discussion about the war. In the end, only the Iraqis themselves can determine whether the war was, after all, a success story. And that maybe is also a call too early to make.

Iraq Fact Sheet

Ad infinitum and tirelessly, I have argued in favour of removing the brutal and tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein because I believe in the premise that our values are only of any worth if applied universally and those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves.

Of course, there were legitimate reasons against the invasion which is why I never claimed moral superiority in regard to anyone else’s opinion.

But is a reasonable and open-minded debate too much asked for? Apparently, it is.

People no longer listen. They have, on both sides of the argument, made up their minds. Now, there only exist right or wrong, black or white; no maybes and no shades of grey.

This is why I have decided to no longer discuss the issue and merely provide an ‘Iraq Fact Sheet’. Judge for yourself!

IRAQ FACT SHEET

Saddam’s casualties

- Iran-Iraq war 1980-8: 600.000 – 1.1 million

- Anfal campaign against Kurds in 1988: 100.000

- Invasion of Kuwait in 1991: 75.000

- Reprisal against Shia minority in 1991: 50.000

- Others: at least 100.000

War casualties

- Iraq Body Watch and Brooking Institution only reliable sources: estimated death toll  100.000 – 112.000

- Of the 100.000 – 112.000, 70.000 were killed by terrorists not coalition forces (especially Al Qaida and Iranian militia)

- Lancet report was invalid, 600.000 included people dying from illness

Legality:

Resolution 678

Authorised Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area

–>Resolution 678 was never revoked  and authorisation to use force remained in being throughout the years (legal basis for actions in 1993 and 1998)

–> The legal advisor to the UN, Dr. Carl – August – Fleischhauer, confirmed that the original authority to use force in Resolution 678 could revive, given that the Security Council is in agreement that there is a violation of the ceasefire. This consideration was reflected in the drafting of UNSCR 1441

–>Resolution 1441, unanimously accepted, was hence only a legal refreshment for Resolution 678

–>Resolution 1441 was drafted in such a way that it was sufficient, in combination with previous UNSC Resolutions, namely 660, 678, 687 and 1137, to lawfully take part in invasion

- 2nd Resolution would have provided political legitimacy but ultimately dependent on power politics of Russia and France

- In 2003, Saddam was in breach of 17 Resolutions

- No legal consistency in international law (no UNSC Resolution for Kosovo; highly unlikely for Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Rwanda)

- Action was authorised by British parliament with 412 votes in favour to 149 opposed

Iraq Survey Group

- David Kay reported in 2003 that, although no WMDs were found, there were large numbers of unaccountable weapons missing and  Saddam was greater threat than coalition thought

- Charles Duelfer reported in 2004 that from the mid-1990s onwards, Saddam made tactical decision to stop WMD programme but kept required scientists and technicians

- With sanctions crumbling (between 1999-2000, Iraqi forces had fired over 700 times into no-fly zone) in 2001/2002, Saddam would have had intent, know-how and money (oil prices were rising from over $30 a barrel in 2003 to almost $140 five years later) to prelaunch his WMD programme

Blix Report

From January 2003

On Chemical Weapons:

- Iraq said it only produced pilot scale of CWs but UNMOVIC disputed account, saying country was in possession of large scale, weaponised material

- Between 1983-8 Iraq used 13.000 chemical bombs, Iraq claims 19.500 were consumed which means a discrepancy of 6.500 unaccounted chemical bombs

- UN inspectors found 122 mm chemical rockets in a new bunker close to Baghdad

On Biological Weapons:

- Strong evidence Iraq produced more anthrax than declared, no evidence of destruction of the material

- Iraq failed to declare 650 kg of bacterial growth media in 1999

- Iraq allowed inspectors access to only 400 people, although UNSCOM knew of 3.500 people involved in weapons programme

–>Blix was clear up to the point of  conflict that Saddam was in breach of Resolution 1441; no ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted’ access

45 minutes

- Not central to war argument

- TB used it only once but not in his key address to parliament

- In 40.000 written parliamentary questions between September 2002 and May 2003 only two mentioned 45 minutes

- In about 5000 oral questions, 45 minutes were not mentioned at all

Additional points

- When Saddam came to power in 1979, Iraq was richer than Portugal

- In 2003, 60 per cent of Iraqi population dependent on foreign food aid (sanctions were not responsible for food shortage, Saddam was allowed to buy as much food and medicine as he liked)

- Child mortality rate was equal to Congo (130 per 1000) under the age of five, made 90.000 per anno

- With exception of North Korea, no other regime in recent decades matched Saddam’s record for inhumanity

- Iraq used CW approximately 195 times between 1983-88

- GDP today is three times that of 2003

- Elections have taken place twice, in 2005 and 2010,  international and domestic monitoring groups described them as free and fair, turn-out was extremely high (up to 75 per cent)

- In 2008, Iraqi parliament already passed legislation to bring Sunni Arabs back into the political process

- Former members of the Ba’athist party were permitted to retake their jobs

- The largest Sunni bloc returned to government and six Sunni ministers joined al-Maliki’s cabinet.

- Saddam was not involved in September 11th but intelligence established Al Zarqawi was active in Iraq since 2002

- War was not sealed in blood at Crawford in 2002 (Meyer was not at the meeting)

- 13 EU countries out of 25 supported the invasion (and very few were actually really opposed)

- If America knew there were no WMDs in Iraq, why not choosing another casus belli?

- Iraq was not about oil, it would have been very easy for the US to make an agreement with Saddam

- False choice between peace and war, there never was peace under Saddam

- If US/UK had not confronted him in 2003 they would have had to at a later point (Arab Spring?)

- Saddam had choice, Libya voluntarily gave up its WMD programme and US and allies reached out to regime

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Thanks to John Rentoul for the mention.