Hezbollah proves EU incapable of having common Foreign & Security Policy

Bulgarian authorities confirmed last week that Iranian-backed, Lebanese Shi’ite terror-organisation Hezbollah was the architect behind the deadly bus bombing that killed five Israeli civilians and the local bus driver in Burgas last summer.

The country’s Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov declared that two of the three suicide bombers “were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah” and that data was “showing the financing and connection between Hezbollah and the two suspects.”

Despite the evidence, both Hezbollah and Iran categorically deny involvement in the attack.

Deputy Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said Israel was directing “allegations and incitements and accusations against Hezbollah” and added that the organisation “will not submit to these pressures (…) and that the compass will remain directed towards Israel.”

A similar message was conveyed by the regime in Theran: “This has nothing to do with Iran,” Gholamreza Bageri told reporters. “We are against any form of terrorism and strongly condemn such actions.”

What makes the Burgas attack particularly explosive is the fact that it happened on European soil sparking new debate over the EU’s policy towards Hezbollah, which varies widely across the Union. The pressure from the US and Canada to ban Hezbollah once and for all is steadily growing.

Right now, the Netherlands is the only country that has Hezbollah on its official terrorist list. It allows the government to outlaw the organisation’s activities, freeze bank accounts and assets, and put suspected members under surveillance.

The UK has a more ambiguous and problematic policy, making a distinction between the organisation’s ‘political’ and ‘military’ wings, although Foreign Secretary William Hague has indicated that the government would likely back a full ban of the organisation.

Throughout the rest of Europe, Hezbollah can engage freely in political activities and fundraising.

In Germany, up to 950 are believed to operate in the country, which is regarded as a stronghold for the organisation in Europe and key to its fundraising capabilities.

Several EU countries remain in strong opposition to a potential EU ban, most notably France and the Scandinavian countries. The latter have a history of remaining neutral and opposing legislation that takes a stance against one group or another. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the EU needs to “reflect seriously on consequences of [the] Bulgarian probe naming Hezbollah as behind [the] terrorist attack.”

France, Lebanon’s former colonial power, believes that outlawing the organisation would put French lives at risk and have a negative impact on the relationship between Paris and Beirut.

So it seems highly unlikely that the Bulgarian attack will eventually lead to a significant change in the EU’s approach towards Hezbollah. To alter the current policy, a unanimous vote would be required by the 27 member states. A full and comprehensive ban is thus almost impossible to achieve. The best compromise seems to be following the British example, whereby the EU would make a distinction between Hezbollah’s political and military wing.

The self-defeating structure and decision-making processes of the EU bring out the worst of the organisation. It makes it incapable of taking decisive action and always reduces it to finding agreement on the lowest common denominator, with the result that the problem remains unsolved.

No one is satisfied with the outcome, but at least no one officially rebels against the decision. That is the EU’s modus operandi.

Such sentiments were reflected by the spokesman of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, who issued a statement in which Hezbollah was not even mentioned by name: “the terrorists who planned and carried out the Burgas attack must be brought to justice.”

But if the EU cannot even resolve a dispute over such a clear cut case, how is it supposed to deal with far more complex and controversial foreign and security policy issues in a competent way?

Hezbollah’s record leaves little doubt over the organisation’s nature and ideology, which is in clear breach of the EU’s fundamental principles.

Hezbollah is Iran’s terror proxy, a country regarded by several EU member states as the greatest current threat to peace and stability in the world, and responsible for the death of thousands of innocent civilians. The EU itself declared in 2012 that there was “clear evidence of terrorist activity” by Hezbollah.

The dichotomy of a political and military wing is misguided and dangerous. Just as much as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness had influence over the IRA’s military council, so has Hassan Nasrallah the ultimate power over all Hezbollah activities. Hezbollah is not a charitable, social movement. It is a terrorist organisation with global outreach, funded by pariah state Iran, which hides behind hospitals and schools to cover up its true agenda and ideology.

The trail of blood speaks for itself.

Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 Beirut bombing that killed 58 French peacekeepers and 241 American Marines, regularly engages in deadly attacks against Israeli civilians, and supports the mass-murdering regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria.

But the EU’s incompetence to speak with one voice in the wake of a crisis has once more been exposed. All the evidence is not enough to compete with the different national policy agendas of EU member states, and to lead to an unequivocal ban of Hezbollah.

The winners are our enemies. They take advantage of such weakness, and exploit our differences. And Europe is letting them.

Syria: should the West be more proactive?

Introduction

The crisis in Syria is on-going and so is the debate about the West’s options to help end the bloodshed. Those in favour of a more pro-active policy are regularly confronted with a variety of arguments against intervention. Some of them are perfectly legitimate and rightly point at the potential risks of Western involvement. The validity of others, however, has to be questioned. In the following, four common myths will be addressed.

1) “Syria is primarily a humanitarian crisis”

The humanitarian crisis in Syria is heart-breaking. According to UN figures, 60,000 people have died since March 2011 and the actual number is likely to be much higher. Thousands are fleeing the violence across the border every day – 84,000 in December 2012 alone – bringing the total number of those displaced to around half a million.

However, as much as Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe, it is also a geo-political, strategic crisis.

Syria is not an isolated case like, for instance, Libya. It is central to holding together the Middle East, as it touches upon various, complex interests. Due to the sectarian nature of the conflict, the spill-over effects into other countries are severe.

Turkey is not only subject to repeated border violations but watches the mobilisation of Kurdish forces in northeast Syria with sheer horror. A sharp increase of terrorist attacks can be witness in Iraq with al-Qaeda exploiting the conflict to regain momentum. Baghdad, like Turkey, is equally concerned about the Kurdish factor. So far, the number of Kurds fleeing into Iraq has been relatively small but if they were to unite, they could shift the balance of power in the country and put pressure on the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, Iran is actively supporting the Assad regime and its proxy militia, Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, is smuggling fighters and weapons into Syria. Syria’s Sunni population, in particular the Islamist fractions among the opposition, are propped up by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As such, the brutal conflict is not only pushing Syria into the humanitarian abyss but is destabilising various other countries to a dangerous degree. It is a recipe for a long-term sectarian strife, destruction, and death across the entire region that will make post-war Iraq look simple.

2) “Syria is lost to Islamic extremists”

The Islamist fractions in Syria are powerful and their influence is steadily growing. Among the 13 Islamic extremist groups are al-Qaeda jihadists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Tawheed Brigade, as well as Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers. In particular, the northern Syrian town of Aleppo has turned into one of their strongholds and in November 2012, they declared it an independent Islamic state.

The Islamists, however, were not the ones who triggered the revolution, though they profited immensely from it. How did they manage to hijack the cause?

On the one hand, the Islamic rebels are supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but even more importantly the moderates have been considerably weakened by the lack of outside support. As one Syrian man stated, he can understand why people turn to the extremists and shout “Allahu akbar”. “Who else has helped us?” he asks. “No one.”

While the post-Assad era is likely to be violent and chaotic, it is not too late to fix some of the damage caused.

Western help can counteract the rise of extremist ideologies. The US-led intervention in Kosovo has pushed back the spread of such ideologies, which are likely to emerge in situations of war and despair, and effectively manifested pro-Western attitudes among the predominantly Muslim population.

Assad has not fallen yet and there is still opportunity to influence, at least to a certain extent, the direction the country will take. When the time for making decisions comes, there is a strong argument for the West’s need to be in that room, rather than outside.

3) “Assad is the guardian of minorities”

A common argument in favour of Assad’s reign is that Syria’s religious minorities have so far enjoyed relative freedom and protection in the country.

It is true that most Christians and Alawites stick with Assad, an autocratic, but secular leader as they fear revenge attacks and religious oppression. They are not giving the Syrian opposition the benefit of the doubt, after what happened in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon.

A Christian man from Syria expressed the dilemma vividly: “If the regime goes, you can forget about Christians in Syria. […] Look what happened to the Christians of Iraq. They had to flee everywhere, while most of the churches were attacked and bombed.”

In contrast, another ethnic minority has long suffered oppression under Assad and his predecessors. The Kurds are the second largest minority in Syria and were among the first to rise up against Assad in 2004. Since then, they have engaged in anti-Assad protests and many have joined the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, there is also doubt among the Kurdish people about their perspectives under a new regime: “Maybe things will be worse for us.”

However, Assad is not the only source of stability and security available to Syria’s Kurds, Christians and Alawites, Druze and Ismaelites. The Syrian Support Group has developed a detailed transitional-justice plan with considerable security-guarantees to stem the danger of post-Assad sectarian violence and lawlessness in rural regions.

As a part of the plan, the Syrian opposition wants to employ carrots and sticks, like partial or full amnesty, to motivate former Assad officials to defect and initiate the process of his fall. Moreover, safe-passage will be guaranteed to Alawites who are not in Assad’s inner circle. In addition, there will also be a fund to compensate war victims and their families.

The plan was developed by a London-based legal firm called McCue & Partners, which is advising the Syrian Support Group. Hopes are that the plan will gain international support at the next Friends of Syria meeting in Italy. Washington Post journalist David Ignatius even went so far as to call the plan “the best idea advanced so far by the Syrian rebels”.

4) “There are no effective military strategies available”

“There is nothing we can do” has become the favourite mantra of the opponents of potential military intervention in Syria. The truth is that we have various options at our disposal, short of a full-scale invasion.

Firstly, we should consider arming the moderate fractions among the opposition. While such undertaking is not without risk, it is indefensible that right now everyone is receiving support but the people that are Syria’s only hope for a brighter future.

Secondly, the Patriots stationed along the Turkish-Syrian border provide us with a unique opportunity to establish a partial No-Fly-Zone. Given that Assad is increasingly killing from the air, the casualty number could be significantly reduced. Once such a zone is created and upheld, humanitarian corridors to address the civilian suffering could be established.

Contrary to what opponents of military intervention claim, Assad’s army is not nearly as strong as perceived and his capabilities greatly exaggerated. Syria’s military forces are better equipped than those of Libya under Gaddafi but the average standard of military efficiency in the Middle East, is relatively low, especially in countries where most weaponry consists of outdated Soviet-era purchases. The number of ground troops are not higher than 100,000, the navy fleet is limited in scope, the air force lacks regular maintenance and Assad has failed to get hold of 60% of his ill-trained reserves.

Thirdly, Syria is not Iraq. Not even the strongest supporters of military intervention, like Republican Senator John McCain, suggest putting boots on the ground. Furthermore, in the case of Iraq a relatively small group of defected intellectuals called for military intervention but in Syria, the animosity against the West is growing precisely because of a lack of action.

Syria, like Libya, has never been a traditional ally of us. But as a Gallup poll in the post-Gaddafi era has shown, Libyans now like Americans more than Canada and several European countries. Maybe it is time to see the revolution in Syria not only as a threat, which it clearly is, but also as an opportunity. But to turn the uprising into something more positive, it is not enough to remain on the side-line and watch as the chaos unfolds.

The “Blood for Oil” Conspiracy is Dead

When the US-led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, one of the most common perceptions was that the primary motive behind the war was the country’s significant oil reserves.

According to a 2002 Pew Poll, 44 per cent British, 75 per cent French, 54 per cent Germans, and 76 per cent Russians were greatly suspicious of US intentions in Iraq and bought into the “blood for oil” narrative. On the contrary, only 22 per cent of Americans believed that the Bush administration’s policy was driven by oil interests.

At the time, experts pointed out that this argument was deeply flawed and a lazy mantra of the war opponents.

While Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world, its output in the early 2000s was modest and accounted for only 3 per cent of total global productivity. Due to the geology of the oilfields and, above all, the poor infrastructure destroyed by years of war, Saddam’s negligence, and the sanctions regime, Iraq had the lowest yield of any major producer, amounting to just 0.8 per cent of its potential output.

The Economist cited a joint study by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James Baker Institute of Rice University, concluding that

it would take nearly a decade and up to $40 billion to revive Iraq’s oil sector. That could lift Iraqi output to 4.2m-6m barrels per day, up from around 2.5m bpd today. However, it would still fall far short of Saudi Arabia’s whopping output of over 8m bpd today.

By the end of 2011, the US had spent almost $802bn on funding the war and, as the Centre for Strategic and International Studies pointed out, Iraq had additional debts of over $100 billion.

On top of that, the US only imports 12.9 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. The vast majority, 8.1 per cent, is provided by Saudi Arabia.

In other words, invading Iraq was an extremely expensive undertaking for the US-led coalition with no guarantee or prospect of considerable profitability.

As Daniel Yergin argued at the time: “no US administration would launch so momentous a campaign just to facilitate a handful of oil development contracts and a moderate increase in supply-half a decade from now.”

The “blood for oil” thesis, at best, represents a small proportion of the truth.

10 years after the invasion of Iraq, who is profiting most from the country’s oil reserves? The US? The UK? No. PetroChina, Russian Lukoil, and Pakistan Petroleum – fierce opponents of the war.

On the other hand, as Germany’s leading weekly news magazine DER SPIEGEL reported this week, “America has not a single, significant oil deal with Baghdad” anymore.

EXXON is moving out of Iraq and PetroChina has taken the lead in the auction of West Qurna – one of the largest oil fields in the world – with Russian Lukoil as a potential competitor. If the Chinese bid is successful, the country will account for 32 per cent of total oil contracts in Iraq.

The “blood for oil” conspiracists owe President Bush an apology.

Rwanda – A Scar on The Consciousness of The International Community

When the darkest chapter in the history of Rwanda began on April 6th, 1994 the country had already been in a state of civil war for four years. What turned it into the fastest killing-spree in modern times was the assassination of Rwandan President Habyarimana and Burundian President Ntaryamira. While at the time, the government in Kigali blamed the RPF for shooting down the helicopter, it is now widely accepted that it was an internal conspiracy within the Hutu community to unleash a tidal wave of hatred against the Tutsi.

The question is whether it would have been possible to foreseen and prevent the mass-slaughter or at least stop it when it was already under way. The idea that the international community was impotent in the face of evil must be wholeheartedly rejected, as it relativises the moral responsibility of those who decided to become a silent accomplice rather than engage in a robust and rigid response to crimes against humanity.

While nobody could have predicted such an immense loss of life, the international community ignored warnings and failed to intervene in the early stages of the annihilation campaign, thus fatally violating its responsibilities by endowing the genocidaires with a blanco check for killing with impunity. The genocide was not only the darkest chapter in the history of Rwanda; it was also one of the darkest chapters in the history of the international community.

France was arming and training the Rwandan government forces, despite the nature of the regime and danger of an escalation of violence. It is beyond question that Mitterrand’s government ignored the increased radicalisation of Habyarimana’s regime for the sake of France’s national interests in the region. This policy was a factor in the equation which made the genocide happen, although there is no indication that the French supported the genocidal ideology per se.

The racial vendetta pursued against the Tutsi had been most prominently summarised in the “Ten Commandments of the Hutu”. A report by Human Rights Watch, published in 1993, indicated that Hutu extremists had already began to enthusiastically carrying them out. The findings were in line with a report issued by the CIA the same year, which concluded that a large-scale atrocity was in the making and “the worst case scenario would involve one-half million people dying”.

Therefore, the international community was aware of the military training and ideological warfare against the Tutsi long before the genocide started and was closely involved in the Arusha Peace Accords, which suggested a power-sharing government between Hutu and Tutsi. But since the Accords were overly in favour of the Tutsi, it should have come to no surprise that many Hutu were deeply suspicious of the deal and especially the extremists among them felt they had everything to lose and nothing to gain.

Even though it might not have been possible in the first one or two weeks to determine whether or not genocide was underway, it was beyond doubt that crimes against humanity were committed on a day-to-day basis. While before the genocide took place the situation in Rwanda could have been classified as a two-sided civil war, it rapidly became apparent who had the upper hand in the conflict after the President’s death and killed soldiers and civilians indiscriminately, turning it into a one-sided mass-slaughter. The international community also knew from credible sources on the ground, especially Belgian and French officials, that democratically elected government members had been assassinated by Hutu extremists, most prominently the moderate Prime Minister.

In his briefings to the UN headquarters, General Dallaire already spoke of crimes against humanity four days after the killing had started, although he did not use the term genocide until the end of the month. But whether or not and when and where the “g-word” was actually used seems to be insignificant, given that a mass-scale atrocity was the undeniable reality in Rwanda at the time. That should have been sufficient enough for the international community to engage in principled humanitarian interventionism in the face of evil.

The most fatal decision which enabled the genocidaires to kill over such a long period of time without any serious, external threat was the mishandling over UNAMIR. Instead of reinforcing the unit, as requested by General Dallaire, the US primarily focused on re-launching the Arusha Peace Accords and negotiating a new cease-fire between the two parties. Even worse, the US and UN officials threatened to pull out peace-keeping forces altogether as a punishment for non-compliance. Unfortunately, that was exactly what the perpetrators wanted.

This became brutally apparent when Hutu extremists kidnapped and ruthlessly killed ten Belgian UN blue helmets. What had happened in Mogadishu just a few years ago was still fresh in the minds of US policy-makers and the American public. The Hutu extremists knew that and, shockingly, the US allowed them to exploit their weakness and followed the request of the Belgians for a UN withdrawal, instead of standing up to the unspeakable horror committed.

Reinforcing UNAMIR or sending Special Forces from abroad could have made the difference between life and death of hundreds of thousands of innocent people, who were left to the mercy of their killers when the powerful nations of the world decided to put their national interests above all else.

In the end, it was not the West, the French Operation Turquoise or Dallaire’s UNAMIR (or UNAMIR II) which halted the genocide, but the troops of Kagame’s RPF. After 800.000 innocent souls lost their lives, the Rwandans finally saved themselves.