The West’s Foreign Policy is not the Root of Terrorism

Take away foreign policy and terrorists would still hate our freedom, democracy, rule of law, gender equality and religious pluralism.

The brutal images coming from Woolwich could not have been more surreal. A man with bloodied hands holds a knife and explains he has just hacked a British soldier to death on the streets of London in broad daylight. His declaration of war reads as follows: “the only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers.  An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.”

Once again, terrorists justified their acts of barbarism under the false premise of challenging the West’s amoral and unethical foreign policy. And yet again too many in the West too readily bought into their narrative.

Michael Moore sarcastically tweeted: “I am outraged that we can’t kill people in other counties without them trying to kill us!” “Those who have sent British troops to wage war in the Arab and Muslim world for more than a decade must share culpability”, ranted Seamus Milne and Glenn Greenwald concluded that “the proximate cause of these attacks are plainly political grievances”. Following their analysis, one could get the impression that Lee Rigby was the perpetrator and not the victim.

The claim that our foreign policy is the root cause or catalyst for terrorism, however, is a logical fallacy and a distortion of the political reality. It must be wholeheartedly and categorically rejected.

Put them to the test and you will find the terrorists’s teaching to be misleading and fraudulent.

Firstly, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were a response, not an initiating provocation to an unprecedented slaughter of civilians on American soil. Despite hundreds of terrorists attacks predated both Gulf Wars and Afghanistan. For example, the first World Trade Center bombing, which killed six and injured over 1000 people, was carried out by a coalition of radical Islamist groups in 1993. And ask yourself how wars fought by American and British soldiers justify atrocities in the name of radical Islam in Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Indonesia or Somalia.

Secondly, terrorists decry neo-imperial aggression and criminal foreign occupations in Muslim countries, yet fight as religious mercenaries all over the world. The Woolwich killers are of Nigerian background. Notwithstanding, one of the men was picked up by police last year on his way to join al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab fighters in Somalia. Take the Syrian civil war as another example. Right now, over 4,000 Hezbollah militants are fighting on behalf of Assad but, apparently, that is not a foreign occupation in the book of jihadists.

Thirdly, radical Islamists ignore the fact that the US-led coalition saved hundreds of thousands of Muslims from Christian Serbs in the Balkan. One reason, of course, is that it does not fit their agenda and directly contradict their propaganda. Even more so, by and large, radical Islamists considered Bosnian Muslims to be too secular and too pro-Western. In other words, they deserved to die. A similar fate awaits Muslims every day across the Middle East if they happen to be of the wrong sect or ethnicity.

None of that can be attributed to the presence of Western troops in Muslim countries.

Our foreign policy should not be restricted by fear of reprisals, nor should we submit our national interests to an ideology of clerical fascism.  Radical Islamists exhibit an undisguised hatred and contempt for life. They hate us not only because of what we do but because of who we are. Take away foreign policy and terrorists would still hate our freedom, democracy, rule of law, gender equality and religious pluralism.

To claim otherwise negates the Taliban’s annihilation of culture, the Wahhabis’ brutal enslavement of women and Iran’s vigilant persecution and killing of homosexuals.

“Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities” – Voltaire once said. Terrorist live and breathe absurdities. Let us stop apologising for our own position.

Interview: Kurdistan, Iraq war & Humanitarian Intervention

I talked to Damian Counsell of Ricochet in a wide-ranging conversation about my recent visit to Iraqi Kurdistan to mark the 25th anniversary of Saddam Hussein’s genocide against its people; why the survivors viewed Allied action as a liberation; the surprising preference of many Kurds for Turkey over the United States as a future partner, and the meaning of humanitarian intervention 10 years after the Iraq War.

Listen in above or subscribe in iTunes. Direct link here.

Saudi Arabia: how should the West act in the face of human rights contraventions?

Saudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy with an extremely arbitrary, reactionary and obscurantist justice system based on the most fundamental codification of Sharia law.

The kingdom’s medieval system of punishment includes chopping off the hands of thieves, flogging homosexuals, and beheading women for alleged adultery. The death penalty can also be carried out by stoning or firing squad followed by crucifixion.

In 2012, some 79 executions took place. One woman was beheaded for witchcraft and sorcery.

The country’s official murder and rape rates are one of the lowest in the world. The actual number, however, is far higher, and is corrupted by women and other minorities’ fear to report assaults committed against them.

The law is more often on the side of the aggressor than on the side of the victim, especially if the victim is not Saudi and male.

Foreign workers, in particular, have absolutely no protection or rights in the kingdom. At the moment, over 1.5 million female foreign maids live and work in Saudi Arabia, of which the majority is from Indonesia. Physical and mental abuse against them is not a rarity; it is a common practice. Many have had their passports taken away by their bosses. They are second class human beings – modern slaves – and are subject to random and unscrupulous attacks from their masters.

In 2010, an Indonesia maid was hospitalised after her boss burned her with an iron, cut off her lips with a pair of scissors and left her to die. Another maid was seriously injured by nails and other metal objects which were hammered into her body, after she complained about over-work.

Months later, Saudi Arabia beheaded a foreign worker and hanged her mutilated body from a helicopter as a warning to her colleagues.

According to Freedom House’sWorld Index, Saudi Arabia belongs to the ‘worst of the worst’ countries in the world.

Despite such an appalling human rights record, the kingdom is the West’s oldest and one of our closest allies in the Arab world.

This is our history. It is nothing to be proud of.

But what are the options on the table? Can we distance ourselves from the House of Saud? Should we encourage their overthrow if and when the Arab Spring hits the country? The brutal truth is that if the House of Saud were to fall, it would have serious repercussions for the West and several Middle Eastern countries, and would likely make the situation worse – even if that seems hard to imagine now.

The fall of the monarchy would touch upon central security and economic interests.

1. Iran: Saudi Arabia is the major counterbalance to Iran in the Arab world, especially since the end of the Saddam Hussein tyranny, and has contained its influence for decades. The demise of the House of Saud would considerably strengthen the regime in Teheran. While it is not an intelligent policy to control one dictatorship with another, as it is likely to result in a disaster in the long-term, it is of critical importance to take the consequences of that scenario into account.

2.  Regional stability: At the same time, the fall of the monarchy would considerably weaken the sheikdoms of the Gulf and the Hashemite Empire of Jordan. The collapse of King Abdullah’s reign, in return, would put the peace with Israel at high risk and undermine the stability of the region even further, with Syria drowning in blood and Egypt ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood.

3. Oil: The oil for security pact between the US and Saudi Arabia was forged by President Roosevelt and Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud on board of the U.S.S. Quincy in 1945. Nowadays, the US retrieves only 8.1% of its oil from the kingdom, as it is one of the world’s largest oil producers itself. Close to 40% of its oil needs are met at home. Europe, however, is far more dependent on the oil supply from the kingdom and would be subject to another economic crisis, if that flow were to stop.

So, how likely is it that Saudi Arabia will be hit by the tidal wave of change that is sweeping across the region? At the moment, it seems unlikely, but possible, that the Arab Spring will have a major impact on the country. It cannot be ruled out, as the kingdom shares some of the key criteria with other countries affected by the revolutions. For example, it suffers from high unemployment among the youth, no freedom of expression, oppression of minorities (in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Shia minority), and gender apartheid.

The House of Saud is indeed concerned and troubled by that scenario. It has significantly increased its security budget, forged closer ties with allies through the Gulf Cooperation Council (Jordan and Morocco were invited to join), supported revolutions that weakened arch-enemy Iran, such as in Libya and Syria, and on the other hand, supported the embattled monarchy of Bahrain, and pumped millions of dollars into Jordan.

But what should be of uppermost concern for the West is the make-up of the opposition to the House of Saud. Although there are some secularist democrats and moderates, the strongest and best organised opposition faction by far, is that of the Wahhabis. They have been part of the establishment ever since the existence of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, due to the alliance between the House of Saud and the clerics. That puts them into a privileged position and makes them the most likely successors to the monarchy.

Wahhabism is the most extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism prevalent in the Middle East and the origin of the radical ideology to which al-Qaeda is subscribed. Given Saudi Arabia’s immense wealth and largest oil reserves in the world, they could spread terror not only across the entire region but the entire planet.

Where does is leave us? Saudi Arabia remains the most complicated case in the Arab World for Western policy-makers. There is no easy way out of our moral dilemma. Tony Blair once said that if one cannot solve a problem, one has to manage it. As we cannot solve the Saudi problem, the best chance we have is to manage it by continuing to put pressure on the monarchy to engage in genuine reform.

Some steps into the right direction have already been taken; women were allowed to represent the country in the Olympics, and last week the king announced that from now on women can join the national assembly. We should be under no illusion, however, that progress in Saudi Arabia will be anything but painfully slow, and there will be many setbacks still to come.

The Saudi dilemma will stay with us for the foreseeable future, but while the West cannot fix the problem, it can at least apply pressure to make a bad situation better.

Hezbollah proves EU incapable of having common Foreign & Security Policy

Bulgarian authorities confirmed last week that Iranian-backed, Lebanese Shi’ite terror-organisation Hezbollah was the architect behind the deadly bus bombing that killed five Israeli civilians and the local bus driver in Burgas last summer.

The country’s Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov declared that two of the three suicide bombers “were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah” and that data was “showing the financing and connection between Hezbollah and the two suspects.”

Despite the evidence, both Hezbollah and Iran categorically deny involvement in the attack.

Deputy Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said Israel was directing “allegations and incitements and accusations against Hezbollah” and added that the organisation “will not submit to these pressures (…) and that the compass will remain directed towards Israel.”

A similar message was conveyed by the regime in Theran: “This has nothing to do with Iran,” Gholamreza Bageri told reporters. “We are against any form of terrorism and strongly condemn such actions.”

What makes the Burgas attack particularly explosive is the fact that it happened on European soil sparking new debate over the EU’s policy towards Hezbollah, which varies widely across the Union. The pressure from the US and Canada to ban Hezbollah once and for all is steadily growing.

Right now, the Netherlands is the only country that has Hezbollah on its official terrorist list. It allows the government to outlaw the organisation’s activities, freeze bank accounts and assets, and put suspected members under surveillance.

The UK has a more ambiguous and problematic policy, making a distinction between the organisation’s ‘political’ and ‘military’ wings, although Foreign Secretary William Hague has indicated that the government would likely back a full ban of the organisation.

Throughout the rest of Europe, Hezbollah can engage freely in political activities and fundraising.

In Germany, up to 950 are believed to operate in the country, which is regarded as a stronghold for the organisation in Europe and key to its fundraising capabilities.

Several EU countries remain in strong opposition to a potential EU ban, most notably France and the Scandinavian countries. The latter have a history of remaining neutral and opposing legislation that takes a stance against one group or another. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the EU needs to “reflect seriously on consequences of [the] Bulgarian probe naming Hezbollah as behind [the] terrorist attack.”

France, Lebanon’s former colonial power, believes that outlawing the organisation would put French lives at risk and have a negative impact on the relationship between Paris and Beirut.

So it seems highly unlikely that the Bulgarian attack will eventually lead to a significant change in the EU’s approach towards Hezbollah. To alter the current policy, a unanimous vote would be required by the 27 member states. A full and comprehensive ban is thus almost impossible to achieve. The best compromise seems to be following the British example, whereby the EU would make a distinction between Hezbollah’s political and military wing.

The self-defeating structure and decision-making processes of the EU bring out the worst of the organisation. It makes it incapable of taking decisive action and always reduces it to finding agreement on the lowest common denominator, with the result that the problem remains unsolved.

No one is satisfied with the outcome, but at least no one officially rebels against the decision. That is the EU’s modus operandi.

Such sentiments were reflected by the spokesman of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, who issued a statement in which Hezbollah was not even mentioned by name: “the terrorists who planned and carried out the Burgas attack must be brought to justice.”

But if the EU cannot even resolve a dispute over such a clear cut case, how is it supposed to deal with far more complex and controversial foreign and security policy issues in a competent way?

Hezbollah’s record leaves little doubt over the organisation’s nature and ideology, which is in clear breach of the EU’s fundamental principles.

Hezbollah is Iran’s terror proxy, a country regarded by several EU member states as the greatest current threat to peace and stability in the world, and responsible for the death of thousands of innocent civilians. The EU itself declared in 2012 that there was “clear evidence of terrorist activity” by Hezbollah.

The dichotomy of a political and military wing is misguided and dangerous. Just as much as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness had influence over the IRA’s military council, so has Hassan Nasrallah the ultimate power over all Hezbollah activities. Hezbollah is not a charitable, social movement. It is a terrorist organisation with global outreach, funded by pariah state Iran, which hides behind hospitals and schools to cover up its true agenda and ideology.

The trail of blood speaks for itself.

Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 Beirut bombing that killed 58 French peacekeepers and 241 American Marines, regularly engages in deadly attacks against Israeli civilians, and supports the mass-murdering regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria.

But the EU’s incompetence to speak with one voice in the wake of a crisis has once more been exposed. All the evidence is not enough to compete with the different national policy agendas of EU member states, and to lead to an unequivocal ban of Hezbollah.

The winners are our enemies. They take advantage of such weakness, and exploit our differences. And Europe is letting them.

Syria: should the West be more proactive?

Introduction

The crisis in Syria is on-going and so is the debate about the West’s options to help end the bloodshed. Those in favour of a more pro-active policy are regularly confronted with a variety of arguments against intervention. Some of them are perfectly legitimate and rightly point at the potential risks of Western involvement. The validity of others, however, has to be questioned. In the following, four common myths will be addressed.

1) “Syria is primarily a humanitarian crisis”

The humanitarian crisis in Syria is heart-breaking. According to UN figures, 60,000 people have died since March 2011 and the actual number is likely to be much higher. Thousands are fleeing the violence across the border every day – 84,000 in December 2012 alone – bringing the total number of those displaced to around half a million.

However, as much as Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe, it is also a geo-political, strategic crisis.

Syria is not an isolated case like, for instance, Libya. It is central to holding together the Middle East, as it touches upon various, complex interests. Due to the sectarian nature of the conflict, the spill-over effects into other countries are severe.

Turkey is not only subject to repeated border violations but watches the mobilisation of Kurdish forces in northeast Syria with sheer horror. A sharp increase of terrorist attacks can be witness in Iraq with al-Qaeda exploiting the conflict to regain momentum. Baghdad, like Turkey, is equally concerned about the Kurdish factor. So far, the number of Kurds fleeing into Iraq has been relatively small but if they were to unite, they could shift the balance of power in the country and put pressure on the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, Iran is actively supporting the Assad regime and its proxy militia, Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, is smuggling fighters and weapons into Syria. Syria’s Sunni population, in particular the Islamist fractions among the opposition, are propped up by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As such, the brutal conflict is not only pushing Syria into the humanitarian abyss but is destabilising various other countries to a dangerous degree. It is a recipe for a long-term sectarian strife, destruction, and death across the entire region that will make post-war Iraq look simple.

2) “Syria is lost to Islamic extremists”

The Islamist fractions in Syria are powerful and their influence is steadily growing. Among the 13 Islamic extremist groups are al-Qaeda jihadists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Tawheed Brigade, as well as Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers. In particular, the northern Syrian town of Aleppo has turned into one of their strongholds and in November 2012, they declared it an independent Islamic state.

The Islamists, however, were not the ones who triggered the revolution, though they profited immensely from it. How did they manage to hijack the cause?

On the one hand, the Islamic rebels are supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but even more importantly the moderates have been considerably weakened by the lack of outside support. As one Syrian man stated, he can understand why people turn to the extremists and shout “Allahu akbar”. “Who else has helped us?” he asks. “No one.”

While the post-Assad era is likely to be violent and chaotic, it is not too late to fix some of the damage caused.

Western help can counteract the rise of extremist ideologies. The US-led intervention in Kosovo has pushed back the spread of such ideologies, which are likely to emerge in situations of war and despair, and effectively manifested pro-Western attitudes among the predominantly Muslim population.

Assad has not fallen yet and there is still opportunity to influence, at least to a certain extent, the direction the country will take. When the time for making decisions comes, there is a strong argument for the West’s need to be in that room, rather than outside.

3) “Assad is the guardian of minorities”

A common argument in favour of Assad’s reign is that Syria’s religious minorities have so far enjoyed relative freedom and protection in the country.

It is true that most Christians and Alawites stick with Assad, an autocratic, but secular leader as they fear revenge attacks and religious oppression. They are not giving the Syrian opposition the benefit of the doubt, after what happened in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon.

A Christian man from Syria expressed the dilemma vividly: “If the regime goes, you can forget about Christians in Syria. […] Look what happened to the Christians of Iraq. They had to flee everywhere, while most of the churches were attacked and bombed.”

In contrast, another ethnic minority has long suffered oppression under Assad and his predecessors. The Kurds are the second largest minority in Syria and were among the first to rise up against Assad in 2004. Since then, they have engaged in anti-Assad protests and many have joined the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, there is also doubt among the Kurdish people about their perspectives under a new regime: “Maybe things will be worse for us.”

However, Assad is not the only source of stability and security available to Syria’s Kurds, Christians and Alawites, Druze and Ismaelites. The Syrian Support Group has developed a detailed transitional-justice plan with considerable security-guarantees to stem the danger of post-Assad sectarian violence and lawlessness in rural regions.

As a part of the plan, the Syrian opposition wants to employ carrots and sticks, like partial or full amnesty, to motivate former Assad officials to defect and initiate the process of his fall. Moreover, safe-passage will be guaranteed to Alawites who are not in Assad’s inner circle. In addition, there will also be a fund to compensate war victims and their families.

The plan was developed by a London-based legal firm called McCue & Partners, which is advising the Syrian Support Group. Hopes are that the plan will gain international support at the next Friends of Syria meeting in Italy. Washington Post journalist David Ignatius even went so far as to call the plan “the best idea advanced so far by the Syrian rebels”.

4) “There are no effective military strategies available”

“There is nothing we can do” has become the favourite mantra of the opponents of potential military intervention in Syria. The truth is that we have various options at our disposal, short of a full-scale invasion.

Firstly, we should consider arming the moderate fractions among the opposition. While such undertaking is not without risk, it is indefensible that right now everyone is receiving support but the people that are Syria’s only hope for a brighter future.

Secondly, the Patriots stationed along the Turkish-Syrian border provide us with a unique opportunity to establish a partial No-Fly-Zone. Given that Assad is increasingly killing from the air, the casualty number could be significantly reduced. Once such a zone is created and upheld, humanitarian corridors to address the civilian suffering could be established.

Contrary to what opponents of military intervention claim, Assad’s army is not nearly as strong as perceived and his capabilities greatly exaggerated. Syria’s military forces are better equipped than those of Libya under Gaddafi but the average standard of military efficiency in the Middle East, is relatively low, especially in countries where most weaponry consists of outdated Soviet-era purchases. The number of ground troops are not higher than 100,000, the navy fleet is limited in scope, the air force lacks regular maintenance and Assad has failed to get hold of 60% of his ill-trained reserves.

Thirdly, Syria is not Iraq. Not even the strongest supporters of military intervention, like Republican Senator John McCain, suggest putting boots on the ground. Furthermore, in the case of Iraq a relatively small group of defected intellectuals called for military intervention but in Syria, the animosity against the West is growing precisely because of a lack of action.

Syria, like Libya, has never been a traditional ally of us. But as a Gallup poll in the post-Gaddafi era has shown, Libyans now like Americans more than Canada and several European countries. Maybe it is time to see the revolution in Syria not only as a threat, which it clearly is, but also as an opportunity. But to turn the uprising into something more positive, it is not enough to remain on the side-line and watch as the chaos unfolds.