Iraq war: 10 years later we are stuck with thought-terminating clichés

38Allow me to make one thing clear in advance: this post is written from the perspective of someone who strongly supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and still maintains the same position. I am not claiming to be entirely unbiased.

That said, I always accepted, then and now, that there were legitimate reasons against the war. As with every complex foreign policy decision, different alternatives were evaluated and genuine pro and contra arguments presented for each possibility. It is a natural, democratic process and one that should be welcomed because, if we take such far-reaching decisions that have a severe impact on our own people and others, we should make sure that all opinions are represented in the process of the debate.

I have great respect for many of the people who opposed the invasion right from the start, including family members and close friends, and also for those who, over the cause of the war, shifted their standpoint from a pro-war to a contra-war position like, for instance, Professor Norman Geras.

Yes, I even understand them in a way. There were moments when I myself had severe doubts over some aspects of the invasion, although I can say in all honesty that I never came close to the point where I felt that we got it completely wrong and should have left Iraq alone. I still believe the removal of Saddam was a moral and just cause and that the positive implications outbalance the negative ones.

In particular, I had issues with several of the US-led coalition’s post-war policies, like the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the De-Ba’athification. The greatest mistake, in my view, was the American exit policy. After the surge of 2007 under the leadership of General Petraeus, it was fair to say, for the first time, that we won the peace in Iraq. But when the Obama administration pulled out too quickly and over-hastily, the situation began to deteriorate again and that was the moment we once more lost the peace in Iraq.

This brings me back to my original point about the pro and contra arguments for the invasion. The greatest issue I have with the opposition to the war is that a significant part of the anti-war movement opposed the invasion not for the right but all the wrong reasons.

In fact, very few of those who marched on the streets of London 10 years ago, had previously spoken out against the intolerable cruelties committed by Saddam’s fascist regime against his own people. Unlike, for instance Tony Blair, who already spoke about the brutal and inhumane nature of Saddam’s rule in the 1990s, long before the Bush administration took office.

Too many of those who were protesting against the war were doing it because of their own, petty politics. As Nick Cohen pointed out, the anti-war movement united the worst elements of the Left – an amalgam of Marxist Leninists, George Galloway fanboys, and radical Islamists.  Their motives were not so much rooted in the humanitarian tradition and a genuine concern for the Iraqi people, but were rather an expression of their deep-rooted anti-Western and anti-establishment sentiments.

Opposition to the war per se was a legitimate and moral position to hold. The tragedy is that the movement was hijacked by individuals with a highly suspicious agenda, who used it for their own ideological and political crusade against those who they despise.

The wellbeing of the Iraqi people was never really central to their cause.

What saddens me is that 10 years later we are basically still stuck in the same level of ignorance. Three points, in particular, are worth addressing.

First of all, as John Rentoul wrote the other day, the opinion of Iraqis is almost entirely absent from the debate, with the possible exception of the Kurds, whose position is rather well-known, as a result of a long history of suffering under Saddam’s regime. But we still know very little about the thoughts of average Iraqis. My prediction is that we would not find a clear cut set of opinion. Neither would the vast majority say that the war was a success, nor that the war was a total failure. Rather, I predict, we would get a variety of views with some arguing that, on balance, they are better off or, on balance, they are worse off.  Furthermore, I would expect the result to be different now than, let’s say, three or four years ago. Ever since the pull-out of the Americans, the situation has deteriorated again and, at the moment, Iraq is also suffering not only from internal Shia-Sunni strife, but spill-over effects from the war in Syria. In recent months, we have seen a sharp increase in terrorist attacks, as Assad’s murderous campaign allowed al-Qaida to slip back into Iraq.

The second point is that the counter-argument is also almost entirely absent from the debate. While it is, of course, rested exclusively on hypotheses, it would be wrong not to take into account the scenario of Iraq still being ruled by Saddam and the implications entailed – a consideration made by Fraser Nelson.

And finally, it is quite tragic that we still cannot have a “moderate” debate about the war in Iraq in which both sides acknowledge that they got some things wrong and some things right. For people like myself that means to admit that, while, on balance, removing Saddam was the right thing to do, we got several things terribly wrong which led to chaos and bloodshed. It is important to learn the right lessons from Iraq, especially if we are going to advocate interventions in the future. At the same time, it is of critical importance not to overlearn the lessons of Iraq. Just because we did not get everything right, does not mean that intervention is always wrong and always causes more harm than good. Several examples, such as Sierra Leone and Kosovo, have proven the opposite. The Iraq war did not discredit the notion of liberal interventionism altogether and it would only be fair of those who opposed the war to acknowledge that we, too, had genuine and legitimate reasons to support the overthrow of a totalitarian, fascist regime.

Only when we start meeting in the middle and realise that Iraq was so much more than a clear cut case, a black and white, right and wrong decision, we can do the debate justice. Apparently, 10 years were not enough, as became clear during the event organised by Huffington Post’s Mehdi Hasan the other week. Maybe, we have to wait another 20 years and leave it to the historians to have an open-minded and intellectually rigorous discussion about the war. In the end, only the Iraqis themselves can determine whether the war was, after all, a success story. And that maybe is also a call too early to make.

The “Blood for Oil” Conspiracy is Dead

When the US-led coalition invaded Iraq in 2003, one of the most common perceptions was that the primary motive behind the war was the country’s significant oil reserves.

UnbenanntAccording to a 2002 Pew Poll, 44 per cent British, 75 per cent French, 54 per cent Germans, and 76 per cent Russians were greatly suspicious of US intentions in Iraq and bought into the “blood for oil” narrative. On the contrary, only 22 per cent of Americans believed that the Bush administration’s policy was driven by oil interests.

At the time, experts pointed out that this argument was deeply flawed and a lazy mantra of the war opponents.

While Iraq has the second largest oil reserves in the world, its output in the early 2000s was modest and accounted for only 3 per cent of total global productivity. Due to the geology of the oilfields and, above all, the poor infrastructure destroyed by years of war, Saddam’s negligence, and the sanctions regime, Iraq had the lowest yield of any major producer, amounting to just 0.8 per cent of its potential output.

The Economist cited a joint study by the Council on Foreign Relations and the James Baker Institute of Rice University, concluding that

it would take nearly a decade and up to $40 billion to revive Iraq’s oil sector. That could lift Iraqi output to 4.2m-6m barrels per day, up from around 2.5m bpd today. However, it would still fall far short of Saudi Arabia’s whopping output of over 8m bpd today.

By the end of 2011, the US had spent almost $802bn on funding the war and, as the Centre for Strategic and International Studies pointed out, Iraq had additional debts of over $100 billion.

On top of that, the US only imports 12.9 per cent of its oil from the Middle East. The vast majority, 8.1 per cent, is provided by Saudi Arabia.

In other words, invading Iraq was an extremely expensive undertaking for the US-led coalition with no guarantee or prospect of considerable profitability.

As Daniel Yergin argued at the time: “no US administration would launch so momentous a campaign just to facilitate a handful of oil development contracts and a moderate increase in supply-half a decade from now.”

The “blood for oil” thesis, at best, represents a small proportion of the truth.

10 years after the invasion of Iraq, who is profiting most from the country’s oil reserves? The US? The UK? No. PetroChina, Russian Lukoil, and Pakistan Petroleum – fierce opponents of the war.

On the other hand, as Germany’s leading weekly news magazine DER SPIEGEL reported this week, “America has not a single, significant oil deal with Baghdad” anymore.

EXXON is moving out of Iraq and PetroChina has taken the lead in the auction of West Qurna – one of the largest oil fields in the world – with Russian Lukoil as a potential competitor. If the Chinese bid is successful, the country will account for 32 per cent of total oil contracts in Iraq.

The “blood for oil” conspiracists owe President Bush an apology.

Galloway is not Labour’s problem but the country’s.

Last night, dictator apologist and Islamist agent George Galloway was voted back in the house of parliament, our cradle of democracy, after devastatingly humiliating Labour in Bradford West (Respect 18,341 / Labour 8,201).

The Labour Party leadership, especially Ed Miliband and Tom Watson, have questions to answer why, although repeatedly warned, they took victory for granted. Blaming Galloway’s success on Tony Blair and the Iraq war, as some absurdly try to do, misses the point. Iraq is at best a symptom; not a cause. Labour won Bradford West twice after the invasion of Iraq.

In the end, Galloway’s appeal derives from his tidal wave of anti-US/Israel propaganda. He is a man who wins elections by resorting to the politics of sectarianism and by exploiting people’s fears and prejudices, creating an unhealthy, to say the least, climate of hatred.

Yesterday, was a sad day for all freedom-loving people. The winners sit in Gaza City, Teheran, Caracas and Damascus.

Galloway is the country’s cancer, not Labour’s. We shall all be working together curing it.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s influence in the Middle East has been greatly undermined and its policy has changed in emphasis and intensity. While during the clash between the two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – the Middle East was part of its ideological battlefield, Russia nowadays often merely reacts to US policy in the region, after shrinking from a superpower to a middle power.

The post-Soviet era was marked by a struggle between the Russian Atlanticists and Eurasians. The former were in favour of a closer partnership with the West, in order to accelerate Russia’s democratic transformation. But the latter considered China, India and the Middle East as the country’s natural allies and rejected a more pro-Western policy, as it is the case up to the present.

After the September 11th, 2001 atrocities in the US, most Western countries offered their support and embraced a policy of counter-terrorism in the Middle East. Russia on the contrary, despite its rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and its problems with Chechnya, has been an obstacle rather than an asset in the fight against global Islamic extremism.

Russia’s policy in the Middle East is inconsistent and ambivalent. Firstly, Russia’s goal is to oppose, sabotage and boycott US foreign policy in the region, in order to counter American hegemony.  This is mostly achieved through diplomatic channels, as for instance by vetoing US resolutions in the UN Security Council, or through arms trades with rogue states, as in case of Iran and Iraq.

Secondly, Russia’s Middle East policy is strongly shaped by strategic calculations, especially in respect to Chechnya. Arguably, no other security concern influences Moscow’s terrorism and Middle East policy more than the situation on the northern Caucasus. Against this background, Russia sought membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference and was successfully granted observer status. The idea behind it was to gain de facto immunity from criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya.

Thirdly, Russia is determined to profit from economic partnerships in the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country no longer self-restrained itself in its arms sales to the region as long as financial arrangements were beneficial for the Russian defence industry.

Although Russia and the United States arguably have a common enemy in radical Islamism, the former nevertheless deliberately undermines the strategy of the latter. Further, although Putin deploys a zero-tolerance policy against Islamic extremism at home, he maintains close relationships, mostly because of political and economic considerations, with countries in the Middle East, which represent similar ideologies.

Russia’s Decline in the Middle East            

From the mid-1950s onwards to its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet Union played an essential part in providing the weaponry of many Arab states. Almost 90 per cent of military equipment in Syria and Libya was coming from the Soviet market. For the country, this was one way of protecting its influence in opposition to its rival, the US, and to help shaping Middle East policy in its own national, strategic interests.

But even during the Cold War, especially towards the end, the Soviet Union was not in a position to compete with the military and financial aid offered by the US. Many of the Arab states became increasingly aware of its domestic economic problems, and sided with the Americans, as for instance Egypt, which cut all ties with the Soviet Union in 1972, and instead turned on the US to enhance its military capabilities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was a fatal blow. The country’s influence in the region significantly suffered and the newly emerging Russia found itself in a disastrous position.  Now incapable of proving the Arab states with large-scale arms sales, it lost almost all of its allies, except of Iran and Iraq, which were boycotted by the US and most Western countries for political reasons. But even these two countries escaped Russian influence more and more, as they were aware of Moscow’s desperate dependence on strategic and economic partnerships in the region and used it for their own advantages.

As a result, Russia’s policy in the Middle East changed from an offensive to a defensive one. Moscow is now primarily concerned with countering US hegemony, containing Islamic extremism on the northern Caucasus and enhancing the country’s influence through economic channels.

The Russian- Iranian Relationship

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis, the US cut all ties with the Islamic Republic, which has become the leading anti-American force in the region. Up to the present day, the US has not opened an embassy on Iranian soil again.

Russia, on the other hand, has been a long and traditional partner for the Iranians. Since 1995, Russia has  also been Iran’s sole partner in the nuclear field and Iran is the third largest importer of Russian weapons, after India and China. Russia signed a deal with the Islamic Republic, worth $800 million, over the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant, for which they sold reactors and turbines.

After it was revealed in 2002 that Iran runs a secret nuclear programme, the country has come under more and more scrutiny from the international community, in particular the US and its Western allies, as many question that Iran plans to use it for peaceful means only. This concern is fuelled by Ahmadinejad’s repeated threats against Israel and some of Iran’s Arab neighbours.

Several UNSCRs have already been issued against the Islamic Republic. UNSCR 1737 was passed in December 2006 and prohibited financial and technical assistance for “Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water and ballistic missile programmes”. Four years later, the country was still in breach of previous resolutions and failed to cooperate with the IAEA inspectors. The Security Council imposed further sanctions on the regime and again called on Teheran to completely suspend its enrichment activities.

Despite supporting some of the diplomatic manoeuvres against Iran, Russia has not significantly altered or downgraded its relationship with Teheran and is arguably in breach of the international community’s sanctions against the Islamic Republic. For instance, Putin finally agreed in 2005 to provide the Bushehr plant with Russian nuclear fuel.

The reason for Russia to maintain close ties with Iran at such a high price are threefold . Firstly, Russia and Iran perceive US hegemony and Western influences as a common threat. Both were particular concerned by the Bush administration’s attempt to expand NATO’s sphere of influence on the Balkans and the Caucasus, areas of strategic importance for both Moscow and Teheran

Secondly, Russia is struggling to contain Islamic extremism at its backdoor, especially in Chechnya, which is why Moscow needs allies in the Islamic world. In return for supporting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Islamic Republic has, at least officially, refrained from actively supporting the Chechen rebel, as any Middle Eastern government which seeks Moscow’s support must either side with their struggle against Chechen separatists or, at a minimum, not protest.

Thirdly, Russia’s alliance with Iran has been highly beneficial and proves that Moscow is prepared to risk its relationship with the West, in particular the US, for economic reasons.

The Russian- Iraq Relationship

As with Iran, economic considerations and political opposition to the US guided Russian policy toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This became strongly apparent in the run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. At the time, sanctions were crumbling and the no-fly zone over the northern and southern part of Iraq was no longer working. Furthermore, Saddam’s regime was able to smuggle prohibited items in and out of the country through its neighbouring borders.

Consequently, the US and its allies pushed for new and stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council, aimed at restoring the no fly zone over the Kurdish region and to seal off the borders to stop illegal trade. This however was strongly opposed by Russia. Moscow was the leading force in trying get sanctions lifted and Putin’s government threatened to veto any UNSCR of that kind.

As the UK’s former ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, recalled “Russia had its own direct relationship with Iraq and was talking with Iraq probably more than any other country”.  He also stated that Iraq’s debt to Russia “was in many billions of dollars resulting from the Iran/Iraq war purchases” and the country “wanted sanctions to be lifted so they could get some of their money back”. At some point, the US and UK even discussed to pay parts of the $8 billion owed to Moscow to gain the country’s support.

Other economic reasons for Russia to oppose a stronger sanction regime and the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam offered them lucrative contracts in return and Moscow wanted to preserve the cashing-in from the UN’s oil-for-food-programme.

But the country also opposed the US-led policy towards Iraq for political considerations. The reasons given by Moscow were highly dubious. While on the one hand, Putin stated that he opposed the war in Iraq because of the strong opposition of Russia’s Muslim, he never displayed much concern about their opinion on Russian policy toward Chechnya.

Another piece of evidence which suggests that the Putin administration actively tried to wage public opinion against the US is that many of the 20,000 protesters, who went on the streets against the war, were given favours in return.

Russia’s relationship with Iraq is a further example of the country’s troubled Middle East policy and unlike in case of Iran, Moscow has not gained a lot from boycotting the toppling of the Baathist regime. In fact, it can be argued that Saddam, by offering Russia lucrative contracts in return to opposition to the US, influenced Russian policy as much as vice versa, which again is an indicator that Moscow’s Middle East policy is defensive rather than offensive.

Further, with Saddam gone, Russia has lost yet another ally in the region and Putin’s decision not to support the removal of Iran’s arch-enemy, also put Russia’s relationship with Teheran under strain.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East Policy

Especially on the issue of Islamic extremism, Moscow’s approach has been Janus-faced. While determined to brutally crushing down those movements at home and on the northern Caucasus, Putin’s administration at the same time maintains close ties with regimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, which represents a similar ideology.

Although Teheran has officially refrained from condemning Russia’s policy in Chechnya, Putin is playing with the devil and Iran continues support for organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. It proves where Iran’s solidarity ultimately lies. Also, despite having been granted observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference, many Arab states are still publicly condemning Russia’s approach to Chechnya. Thus, in the short-term, Moscow maybe succeeds in containing the situation on the northern Caucasus with its purpose alliances in the Middle East, but in the long-term it will hardly solves the problem.

Moreover, even though Russia experienced a limited surge of influence when the US and allies where under severe pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia failed to sustainably increase its influence in the region, and consequently Moscow’s Middle East policy remains defensive rather than offensive. Additionally, Russia did not effectively boycott and sabotage decisive policy decisions of the US and its Western allies, as for instance in case of Iraq. Also, with Saddam’s regime gone, Iran under tremendous pressure from the international community and Assad, another ally of Russia, on the brink in Syria, the country has to expect further backlashes.

The only of the three objectives Russia fulfilled was to enhance its economic partnerships in the region. Especially its support for Iran’s nuclear programme has brought in a lot of money for Moscow. In recent years, in particular under Putin’s leadership, Russia has also successfully intensified economic relationships with Israel and other Arab countries, which were not traditional trading partners of Russia.

In sum, Russia has failed to make priorities in the Middle East and got caught up in many conflicts of interest and policy dilemmas. Instead of focusing on specific goals, Moscow has often pursued opportunistic ends, resulting in inconsistent and ambivalent decision-making processes.

Iraq Fact Sheet

Ad infinitum and tirelessly, I have argued in favour of removing the brutal and tyrannical regime of Saddam Hussein because I believe in the premise that our values are only of any worth if applied universally and those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves.

Of course, there were legitimate reasons against the invasion which is why I never claimed moral superiority in regard to anyone else’s opinion.

But is a reasonable and open-minded debate too much asked for? Apparently, it is.

People no longer listen. They have, on both sides of the argument, made up their minds. Now, there only exist right or wrong, black or white; no maybes and no shades of grey.

This is why I have decided to no longer discuss the issue and merely provide an ‘Iraq Fact Sheet’. Judge for yourself!

IRAQ FACT SHEET

Saddam’s casualties

- Iran-Iraq war 1980-8: 600.000 – 1.1 million

- Anfal campaign against Kurds in 1988: 100.000

- Invasion of Kuwait in 1991: 75.000

- Reprisal against Shia minority in 1991: 50.000

- Others: at least 100.000

War casualties

- Iraq Body Watch and Brooking Institution only reliable sources: estimated death toll  100.000 – 112.000

- Of the 100.000 – 112.000, 70.000 were killed by terrorists not coalition forces (especially Al Qaida and Iranian militia)

- Lancet report was invalid, 600.000 included people dying from illness

Legality:

Resolution 678

Authorised Member States to use all necessary means to uphold and implement its Resolution 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990 and all relevant subsequent to Resolution 660 (1990) and to restore international peace and security in the area

–>Resolution 678 was never revoked  and authorisation to use force remained in being throughout the years (legal basis for actions in 1993 and 1998)

–> The legal advisor to the UN, Dr. Carl – August – Fleischhauer, confirmed that the original authority to use force in Resolution 678 could revive, given that the Security Council is in agreement that there is a violation of the ceasefire. This consideration was reflected in the drafting of UNSCR 1441

–>Resolution 1441, unanimously accepted, was hence only a legal refreshment for Resolution 678

–>Resolution 1441 was drafted in such a way that it was sufficient, in combination with previous UNSC Resolutions, namely 660, 678, 687 and 1137, to lawfully take part in invasion

- 2nd Resolution would have provided political legitimacy but ultimately dependent on power politics of Russia and France

- In 2003, Saddam was in breach of 17 Resolutions

- No legal consistency in international law (no UNSC Resolution for Kosovo; highly unlikely for Sierra Leone, Bosnia and Rwanda)

- Action was authorised by British parliament with 412 votes in favour to 149 opposed

Iraq Survey Group

- David Kay reported in 2003 that, although no WMDs were found, there were large numbers of unaccountable weapons missing and  Saddam was greater threat than coalition thought

- Charles Duelfer reported in 2004 that from the mid-1990s onwards, Saddam made tactical decision to stop WMD programme but kept required scientists and technicians

- With sanctions crumbling (between 1999-2000, Iraqi forces had fired over 700 times into no-fly zone) in 2001/2002, Saddam would have had intent, know-how and money (oil prices were rising from over $30 a barrel in 2003 to almost $140 five years later) to prelaunch his WMD programme

Blix Report

From January 2003

On Chemical Weapons:

- Iraq said it only produced pilot scale of CWs but UNMOVIC disputed account, saying country was in possession of large scale, weaponised material

- Between 1983-8 Iraq used 13.000 chemical bombs, Iraq claims 19.500 were consumed which means a discrepancy of 6.500 unaccounted chemical bombs

- UN inspectors found 122 mm chemical rockets in a new bunker close to Baghdad

On Biological Weapons:

- Strong evidence Iraq produced more anthrax than declared, no evidence of destruction of the material

- Iraq failed to declare 650 kg of bacterial growth media in 1999

- Iraq allowed inspectors access to only 400 people, although UNSCOM knew of 3.500 people involved in weapons programme

–>Blix was clear up to the point of  conflict that Saddam was in breach of Resolution 1441; no ‘immediate, unconditional and unrestricted’ access

45 minutes

- Not central to war argument

- TB used it only once but not in his key address to parliament

- In 40.000 written parliamentary questions between September 2002 and May 2003 only two mentioned 45 minutes

- In about 5000 oral questions, 45 minutes were not mentioned at all

Additional points

- When Saddam came to power in 1979, Iraq was richer than Portugal

- In 2003, 60 per cent of Iraqi population dependent on foreign food aid (sanctions were not responsible for food shortage, Saddam was allowed to buy as much food and medicine as he liked)

- Child mortality rate was equal to Congo (130 per 1000) under the age of five, made 90.000 per anno

- With exception of North Korea, no other regime in recent decades matched Saddam’s record for inhumanity

- Iraq used CW approximately 195 times between 1983-88

- GDP today is three times that of 2003

- Elections have taken place twice, in 2005 and 2010,  international and domestic monitoring groups described them as free and fair, turn-out was extremely high (up to 75 per cent)

- In 2008, Iraqi parliament already passed legislation to bring Sunni Arabs back into the political process

- Former members of the Ba’athist party were permitted to retake their jobs

- The largest Sunni bloc returned to government and six Sunni ministers joined al-Maliki’s cabinet.

- Saddam was not involved in September 11th but intelligence established Al Zarqawi was active in Iraq since 2002

- War was not sealed in blood at Crawford in 2002 (Meyer was not at the meeting)

- 13 EU countries out of 25 supported the invasion (and very few were actually really opposed)

- If America knew there were no WMDs in Iraq, why not choosing another casus belli?

- Iraq was not about oil, it would have been very easy for the US to make an agreement with Saddam

- False choice between peace and war, there never was peace under Saddam

- If US/UK had not confronted him in 2003 they would have had to at a later point (Arab Spring?)

- Saddam had choice, Libya voluntarily gave up its WMD programme and US and allies reached out to regime

——————————————————————————————

Thanks to John Rentoul for the mention.