Saudi Arabia: how should the West act in the face of human rights contraventions?

23391_webSaudi Arabia is the world’s last absolute monarchy with an extremely arbitrary, reactionary and obscurantist justice system based on the most fundamental codification of Sharia law.

The kingdom’s medieval system of punishment includes chopping off the hands of thieves, flogging homosexuals, and beheading women for alleged adultery. The death penalty can also be carried out by stoning or firing squad followed by crucifixion.

In 2012, some 79 executions took place. One woman was beheaded for witchcraft and sorcery.

The country’s official murder and rape rates are one of the lowest in the world. The actual number, however, is far higher, and is corrupted by women and other minorities’ fear to report assaults committed against them.

The law is more often on the side of the aggressor than on the side of the victim, especially if the victim is not Saudi and male.

Foreign workers, in particular, have absolutely no protection or rights in the kingdom. At the moment, over 1.5 million female foreign maids live and work in Saudi Arabia, of which the majority is from Indonesia. Physical and mental abuse against them is not a rarity; it is a common practice. Many have had their passports taken away by their bosses. They are second class human beings – modern slaves – and are subject to random and unscrupulous attacks from their masters.

In 2010, an Indonesia maid was hospitalised after her boss burned her with an iron, cut off her lips with a pair of scissors and left her to die. Another maid was seriously injured by nails and other metal objects which were hammered into her body, after she complained about over-work.

Months later, Saudi Arabia beheaded a foreign worker and hanged her mutilated body from a helicopter as a warning to her colleagues.

According to Freedom House’sWorld Index, Saudi Arabia belongs to the ‘worst of the worst’ countries in the world.

Despite such an appalling human rights record, the kingdom is the West’s oldest and one of our closest allies in the Arab world.

This is our history. It is nothing to be proud of.

But what are the options on the table? Can we distance ourselves from the House of Saud? Should we encourage their overthrow if and when the Arab Spring hits the country? The brutal truth is that if the House of Saud were to fall, it would have serious repercussions for the West and several Middle Eastern countries, and would likely make the situation worse – even if that seems hard to imagine now.

The fall of the monarchy would touch upon central security and economic interests.

1. Iran: Saudi Arabia is the major counterbalance to Iran in the Arab world, especially since the end of the Saddam Hussein tyranny, and has contained its influence for decades. The demise of the House of Saud would considerably strengthen the regime in Teheran. While it is not an intelligent policy to control one dictatorship with another, as it is likely to result in a disaster in the long-term, it is of critical importance to take the consequences of that scenario into account.

2.  Regional stability: At the same time, the fall of the monarchy would considerably weaken the sheikdoms of the Gulf and the Hashemite Empire of Jordan. The collapse of King Abdullah’s reign, in return, would put the peace with Israel at high risk and undermine the stability of the region even further, with Syria drowning in blood and Egypt ruled by the Muslim Brotherhood.

3. Oil: The oil for security pact between the US and Saudi Arabia was forged by President Roosevelt and Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud on board of the U.S.S. Quincy in 1945. Nowadays, the US retrieves only 8.1% of its oil from the kingdom, as it is one of the world’s largest oil producers itself. Close to 40% of its oil needs are met at home. Europe, however, is far more dependent on the oil supply from the kingdom and would be subject to another economic crisis, if that flow were to stop.

So, how likely is it that Saudi Arabia will be hit by the tidal wave of change that is sweeping across the region? At the moment, it seems unlikely, but possible, that the Arab Spring will have a major impact on the country. It cannot be ruled out, as the kingdom shares some of the key criteria with other countries affected by the revolutions. For example, it suffers from high unemployment among the youth, no freedom of expression, oppression of minorities (in the case of Saudi Arabia, the Shia minority), and gender apartheid.

The House of Saud is indeed concerned and troubled by that scenario. It has significantly increased its security budget, forged closer ties with allies through the Gulf Cooperation Council (Jordan and Morocco were invited to join), supported revolutions that weakened arch-enemy Iran, such as in Libya and Syria, and on the other hand, supported the embattled monarchy of Bahrain, and pumped millions of dollars into Jordan.

But what should be of uppermost concern for the West is the make-up of the opposition to the House of Saud. Although there are some secularist democrats and moderates, the strongest and best organised opposition faction by far, is that of the Wahhabis. They have been part of the establishment ever since the existence of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, due to the alliance between the House of Saud and the clerics. That puts them into a privileged position and makes them the most likely successors to the monarchy.

Wahhabism is the most extreme form of Islamic fundamentalism prevalent in the Middle East and the origin of the radical ideology to which al-Qaeda is subscribed. Given Saudi Arabia’s immense wealth and largest oil reserves in the world, they could spread terror not only across the entire region but the entire planet.

Where does is leave us? Saudi Arabia remains the most complicated case in the Arab World for Western policy-makers. There is no easy way out of our moral dilemma. Tony Blair once said that if one cannot solve a problem, one has to manage it. As we cannot solve the Saudi problem, the best chance we have is to manage it by continuing to put pressure on the monarchy to engage in genuine reform.

Some steps into the right direction have already been taken; women were allowed to represent the country in the Olympics, and last week the king announced that from now on women can join the national assembly. We should be under no illusion, however, that progress in Saudi Arabia will be anything but painfully slow, and there will be many setbacks still to come.

The Saudi dilemma will stay with us for the foreseeable future, but while the West cannot fix the problem, it can at least apply pressure to make a bad situation better.

Syria: should the West be more proactive?

640x392_13200_205941Introduction

The crisis in Syria is on-going and so is the debate about the West’s options to help end the bloodshed. Those in favour of a more pro-active policy are regularly confronted with a variety of arguments against intervention. Some of them are perfectly legitimate and rightly point at the potential risks of Western involvement. The validity of others, however, has to be questioned. In the following, four common myths will be addressed.

1) “Syria is primarily a humanitarian crisis”

The humanitarian crisis in Syria is heart-breaking. According to UN figures, 60,000 people have died since March 2011 and the actual number is likely to be much higher. Thousands are fleeing the violence across the border every day – 84,000 in December 2012 alone – bringing the total number of those displaced to around half a million.

However, as much as Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe, it is also a geo-political, strategic crisis.

Syria is not an isolated case like, for instance, Libya. It is central to holding together the Middle East, as it touches upon various, complex interests. Due to the sectarian nature of the conflict, the spill-over effects into other countries are severe.

Turkey is not only subject to repeated border violations but watches the mobilisation of Kurdish forces in northeast Syria with sheer horror. A sharp increase of terrorist attacks can be witness in Iraq with al-Qaeda exploiting the conflict to regain momentum. Baghdad, like Turkey, is equally concerned about the Kurdish factor. So far, the number of Kurds fleeing into Iraq has been relatively small but if they were to unite, they could shift the balance of power in the country and put pressure on the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, Iran is actively supporting the Assad regime and its proxy militia, Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, is smuggling fighters and weapons into Syria. Syria’s Sunni population, in particular the Islamist fractions among the opposition, are propped up by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As such, the brutal conflict is not only pushing Syria into the humanitarian abyss but is destabilising various other countries to a dangerous degree. It is a recipe for a long-term sectarian strife, destruction, and death across the entire region that will make post-war Iraq look simple.

2) “Syria is lost to Islamic extremists”

The Islamist fractions in Syria are powerful and their influence is steadily growing. Among the 13 Islamic extremist groups are al-Qaeda jihadists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Tawheed Brigade, as well as Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers. In particular, the northern Syrian town of Aleppo has turned into one of their strongholds and in November 2012, they declared it an independent Islamic state.

The Islamists, however, were not the ones who triggered the revolution, though they profited immensely from it. How did they manage to hijack the cause?

On the one hand, the Islamic rebels are supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but even more importantly the moderates have been considerably weakened by the lack of outside support. As one Syrian man stated, he can understand why people turn to the extremists and shout “Allahu akbar”. “Who else has helped us?” he asks. “No one.”

While the post-Assad era is likely to be violent and chaotic, it is not too late to fix some of the damage caused.

Western help can counteract the rise of extremist ideologies. The US-led intervention in Kosovo has pushed back the spread of such ideologies, which are likely to emerge in situations of war and despair, and effectively manifested pro-Western attitudes among the predominantly Muslim population.

Assad has not fallen yet and there is still opportunity to influence, at least to a certain extent, the direction the country will take. When the time for making decisions comes, there is a strong argument for the West’s need to be in that room, rather than outside.

3) “Assad is the guardian of minorities”

A common argument in favour of Assad’s reign is that Syria’s religious minorities have so far enjoyed relative freedom and protection in the country.

It is true that most Christians and Alawites stick with Assad, an autocratic, but secular leader as they fear revenge attacks and religious oppression. They are not giving the Syrian opposition the benefit of the doubt, after what happened in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon.

A Christian man from Syria expressed the dilemma vividly: “If the regime goes, you can forget about Christians in Syria. […] Look what happened to the Christians of Iraq. They had to flee everywhere, while most of the churches were attacked and bombed.”

In contrast, another ethnic minority has long suffered oppression under Assad and his predecessors. The Kurds are the second largest minority in Syria and were among the first to rise up against Assad in 2004. Since then, they have engaged in anti-Assad protests and many have joined the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, there is also doubt among the Kurdish people about their perspectives under a new regime: “Maybe things will be worse for us.”

However, Assad is not the only source of stability and security available to Syria’s Kurds, Christians and Alawites, Druze and Ismaelites. The Syrian Support Group has developed a detailed transitional-justice plan with considerable security-guarantees to stem the danger of post-Assad sectarian violence and lawlessness in rural regions.

As a part of the plan, the Syrian opposition wants to employ carrots and sticks, like partial or full amnesty, to motivate former Assad officials to defect and initiate the process of his fall. Moreover, safe-passage will be guaranteed to Alawites who are not in Assad’s inner circle. In addition, there will also be a fund to compensate war victims and their families.

The plan was developed by a London-based legal firm called McCue & Partners, which is advising the Syrian Support Group. Hopes are that the plan will gain international support at the next Friends of Syria meeting in Italy. Washington Post journalist David Ignatius even went so far as to call the plan “the best idea advanced so far by the Syrian rebels”.

4) “There are no effective military strategies available”

“There is nothing we can do” has become the favourite mantra of the opponents of potential military intervention in Syria. The truth is that we have various options at our disposal, short of a full-scale invasion.

Firstly, we should consider arming the moderate fractions among the opposition. While such undertaking is not without risk, it is indefensible that right now everyone is receiving support but the people that are Syria’s only hope for a brighter future.

Secondly, the Patriots stationed along the Turkish-Syrian border provide us with a unique opportunity to establish a partial No-Fly-Zone. Given that Assad is increasingly killing from the air, the casualty number could be significantly reduced. Once such a zone is created and upheld, humanitarian corridors to address the civilian suffering could be established.

Contrary to what opponents of military intervention claim, Assad’s army is not nearly as strong as perceived and his capabilities greatly exaggerated. Syria’s military forces are better equipped than those of Libya under Gaddafi but the average standard of military efficiency in the Middle East, is relatively low, especially in countries where most weaponry consists of outdated Soviet-era purchases. The number of ground troops are not higher than 100,000, the navy fleet is limited in scope, the air force lacks regular maintenance and Assad has failed to get hold of 60% of his ill-trained reserves.

Thirdly, Syria is not Iraq. Not even the strongest supporters of military intervention, like Republican Senator John McCain, suggest putting boots on the ground. Furthermore, in the case of Iraq a relatively small group of defected intellectuals called for military intervention but in Syria, the animosity against the West is growing precisely because of a lack of action.

Syria, like Libya, has never been a traditional ally of us. But as a Gallup poll in the post-Gaddafi era has shown, Libyans now like Americans more than Canada and several European countries. Maybe it is time to see the revolution in Syria not only as a threat, which it clearly is, but also as an opportunity. But to turn the uprising into something more positive, it is not enough to remain on the side-line and watch as the chaos unfolds.

Biden’s Web of Lies

One cannot expect much from a man who suggested to split Iraq into three autonomous regions but even by Biden’s generally low foreign policy standards, his comments on the Middle East in last week’s VP debate were breathtakingly oversimplified and disingenuous.

Biden started the debate with a desperate attempt to cover-up the debacle surrounding the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi. The Vice President failed to answer at least two crucial questions: a) why did Obama, Clinton and Rice apologise to a mob of extremists? and b) why did the US embassy staff had inadequate security?

Biden told an outright lie when he refused to call the attack what it was – an act of terrorism – and instead defended the administration’s discredited narrative. He carefully avoided mentioning the YouTube video which was, after all, nothing but a cover-up for a pre-planned assault against America on the anniversary of 9/11.

He further denied the allegation that the States Department had refused to tighten security, after repeated requests from personnel on the ground. Two officials, however, testified before Congress that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Charlene Lamb, was aware of the delicate security situation and failed to take appropriate action.

Ultimately, the negligence cost Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other servicemen their lives and someone in the Obama administration must be held accountable for it.

Biden’s quality of answers did not change appreciably when the moderator turned to Iran. For reasons only known to him, the Vice President started giggling when Martha Raddatz questioned him on the ayatollahs’ intention to acquire nuclear capabilities. He relativised the threat post by the Islamic Republic, despite the regime being the greatest risk to peace and stability in the Middle East and the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the region. His assessment of the status of Iran’s nuclear programme struck me as startlingly and dangerously naïve. There is credible evidence which suggests that Iran continues to stockpile uranium enriched to up to 20% purity, a nonessential procedure, unless one plans to build an atomic bomb. 225 kg of 20 percent is sufficient to make 25 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium.

Continuing the trend, the Vice President’s comments on the humanitarian and strategic crisis in Syria can be described as nothing but utterly shameless. According to Biden, the US government is doing everything in its power to stop the bloodshed and cooperates closely with its Arab allies. But if that were true, why would Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, amongst others, complain that the administration’s Syria policy is counterproductive, even destructive, and impedes their efforts to support the Syrian opposition?

Biden made it sound as if there was nothing else the US could do without sending troops to Syria. This, however, is a false choice. In fact, no one, not even the most hawkish supporters of intervention, like Senator John McCain, consider boots on the ground. What they suggest is arming the rebels, setting up humanitarian corridors along the Turkish-Syrian border, and establishing a NFZ to protect civilians from the wrath of Assad’s air force. NFZs worked well in the past, as for instance in Iraq, in the Balkans, and Libya, without zero Western casualties. So again, Biden resorted to overblown assumptions and scaremongering tactics to justify the Obama administration’s colossal moral failure and total absence of leadership in the Middle East.

And just when you thought things could not get any worse, Biden outlined his deeply cynical and reckless approach on the on-going war in Afghanistan. “We are leaving in 2014 – period”, he said. What message does that send to the Taliban? Not only does it strengthen our enemies in the sense that they know that they can play on time, as we will pull out in 2014 no matter the situation, but it also raises the moral question of whether our Afghanistan policy should really be determined by a fixed timetable or degree of success.

Our fallen shall not have died in vain.

Biden reached a climax of hypocrisy when he boasted about the Iraq pull-out. What he did not say, however, was that pulling troops out too quickly allowed al-Qaeda back into the country and now threatens the carefully-constructed peace. On top of that, the Vice President attacked Ryan on the Republican’s legacy of war. “No, we can’t afford that”, he apparently said when George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. Too bad that, in fact, Biden voted in favour of both the Afghanistan and Iraq resolutions which authorised military action.

Post-revisionism at its finest.

In sum, Biden’s performance was embarrassing and unprofessional. One can engage in serious debate or mock and ridicule one’s opponent. The Vice President clearly chose the latter approach. He may have won the drama class award but Ryan convinced with facts and figures.