Biden’s Web of Lies

One cannot expect much from a man who suggested to split Iraq into three autonomous regions but even by Biden’s generally low foreign policy standards, his comments on the Middle East in last week’s VP debate were breathtakingly oversimplified and disingenuous.

Biden started the debate with a desperate attempt to cover-up the debacle surrounding the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi. The Vice President failed to answer at least two crucial questions: a) why did Obama, Clinton and Rice apologise to a mob of extremists? and b) why did the US embassy staff had inadequate security?

Biden told an outright lie when he refused to call the attack what it was – an act of terrorism – and instead defended the administration’s discredited narrative. He carefully avoided mentioning the YouTube video which was, after all, nothing but a cover-up for a pre-planned assault against America on the anniversary of 9/11.

He further denied the allegation that the States Department had refused to tighten security, after repeated requests from personnel on the ground. Two officials, however, testified before Congress that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Charlene Lamb, was aware of the delicate security situation and failed to take appropriate action.

Ultimately, the negligence cost Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other servicemen their lives and someone in the Obama administration must be held accountable for it.

Biden’s quality of answers did not change appreciably when the moderator turned to Iran. For reasons only known to him, the Vice President started giggling when Martha Raddatz questioned him on the ayatollahs’ intention to acquire nuclear capabilities. He relativised the threat post by the Islamic Republic, despite the regime being the greatest risk to peace and stability in the Middle East and the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the region. His assessment of the status of Iran’s nuclear programme struck me as startlingly and dangerously naïve. There is credible evidence which suggests that Iran continues to stockpile uranium enriched to up to 20% purity, a nonessential procedure, unless one plans to build an atomic bomb. 225 kg of 20 percent is sufficient to make 25 kg of 90 percent enriched uranium.

Continuing the trend, the Vice President’s comments on the humanitarian and strategic crisis in Syria can be described as nothing but utterly shameless. According to Biden, the US government is doing everything in its power to stop the bloodshed and cooperates closely with its Arab allies. But if that were true, why would Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, amongst others, complain that the administration’s Syria policy is counterproductive, even destructive, and impedes their efforts to support the Syrian opposition?

Biden made it sound as if there was nothing else the US could do without sending troops to Syria. This, however, is a false choice. In fact, no one, not even the most hawkish supporters of intervention, like Senator John McCain, consider boots on the ground. What they suggest is arming the rebels, setting up humanitarian corridors along the Turkish-Syrian border, and establishing a NFZ to protect civilians from the wrath of Assad’s air force. NFZs worked well in the past, as for instance in Iraq, in the Balkans, and Libya, without zero Western casualties. So again, Biden resorted to overblown assumptions and scaremongering tactics to justify the Obama administration’s colossal moral failure and total absence of leadership in the Middle East.

And just when you thought things could not get any worse, Biden outlined his deeply cynical and reckless approach on the on-going war in Afghanistan. “We are leaving in 2014 – period”, he said. What message does that send to the Taliban? Not only does it strengthen our enemies in the sense that they know that they can play on time, as we will pull out in 2014 no matter the situation, but it also raises the moral question of whether our Afghanistan policy should really be determined by a fixed timetable or degree of success.

Our fallen shall not have died in vain.

Biden reached a climax of hypocrisy when he boasted about the Iraq pull-out. What he did not say, however, was that pulling troops out too quickly allowed al-Qaeda back into the country and now threatens the carefully-constructed peace. On top of that, the Vice President attacked Ryan on the Republican’s legacy of war. “No, we can’t afford that”, he apparently said when George W. Bush invaded Afghanistan and Iraq. Too bad that, in fact, Biden voted in favour of both the Afghanistan and Iraq resolutions which authorised military action.

Post-revisionism at its finest.

In sum, Biden’s performance was embarrassing and unprofessional. One can engage in serious debate or mock and ridicule one’s opponent. The Vice President clearly chose the latter approach. He may have won the drama class award but Ryan convinced with facts and figures.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East policy

Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s influence in the Middle East has been greatly undermined and its policy has changed in emphasis and intensity. While during the clash between the two superpowers – the US and the Soviet Union – the Middle East was part of its ideological battlefield, Russia nowadays often merely reacts to US policy in the region, after shrinking from a superpower to a middle power.

The post-Soviet era was marked by a struggle between the Russian Atlanticists and Eurasians. The former were in favour of a closer partnership with the West, in order to accelerate Russia’s democratic transformation. But the latter considered China, India and the Middle East as the country’s natural allies and rejected a more pro-Western policy, as it is the case up to the present.

After the September 11th, 2001 atrocities in the US, most Western countries offered their support and embraced a policy of counter-terrorism in the Middle East. Russia on the contrary, despite its rhetoric in the immediate aftermath of the attacks and its problems with Chechnya, has been an obstacle rather than an asset in the fight against global Islamic extremism.

Russia’s policy in the Middle East is inconsistent and ambivalent. Firstly, Russia’s goal is to oppose, sabotage and boycott US foreign policy in the region, in order to counter American hegemony.  This is mostly achieved through diplomatic channels, as for instance by vetoing US resolutions in the UN Security Council, or through arms trades with rogue states, as in case of Iran and Iraq.

Secondly, Russia’s Middle East policy is strongly shaped by strategic calculations, especially in respect to Chechnya. Arguably, no other security concern influences Moscow’s terrorism and Middle East policy more than the situation on the northern Caucasus. Against this background, Russia sought membership in the Organisation of Islamic Conference and was successfully granted observer status. The idea behind it was to gain de facto immunity from criticism of Russian policy in Chechnya.

Thirdly, Russia is determined to profit from economic partnerships in the Middle East. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country no longer self-restrained itself in its arms sales to the region as long as financial arrangements were beneficial for the Russian defence industry.

Although Russia and the United States arguably have a common enemy in radical Islamism, the former nevertheless deliberately undermines the strategy of the latter. Further, although Putin deploys a zero-tolerance policy against Islamic extremism at home, he maintains close relationships, mostly because of political and economic considerations, with countries in the Middle East, which represent similar ideologies.

Russia’s Decline in the Middle East            

From the mid-1950s onwards to its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet Union played an essential part in providing the weaponry of many Arab states. Almost 90 per cent of military equipment in Syria and Libya was coming from the Soviet market. For the country, this was one way of protecting its influence in opposition to its rival, the US, and to help shaping Middle East policy in its own national, strategic interests.

But even during the Cold War, especially towards the end, the Soviet Union was not in a position to compete with the military and financial aid offered by the US. Many of the Arab states became increasingly aware of its domestic economic problems, and sided with the Americans, as for instance Egypt, which cut all ties with the Soviet Union in 1972, and instead turned on the US to enhance its military capabilities.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was a fatal blow. The country’s influence in the region significantly suffered and the newly emerging Russia found itself in a disastrous position.  Now incapable of proving the Arab states with large-scale arms sales, it lost almost all of its allies, except of Iran and Iraq, which were boycotted by the US and most Western countries for political reasons. But even these two countries escaped Russian influence more and more, as they were aware of Moscow’s desperate dependence on strategic and economic partnerships in the region and used it for their own advantages.

As a result, Russia’s policy in the Middle East changed from an offensive to a defensive one. Moscow is now primarily concerned with countering US hegemony, containing Islamic extremism on the northern Caucasus and enhancing the country’s influence through economic channels.

The Russian- Iranian Relationship

After the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the hostage crisis, the US cut all ties with the Islamic Republic, which has become the leading anti-American force in the region. Up to the present day, the US has not opened an embassy on Iranian soil again.

Russia, on the other hand, has been a long and traditional partner for the Iranians. Since 1995, Russia has  also been Iran’s sole partner in the nuclear field and Iran is the third largest importer of Russian weapons, after India and China. Russia signed a deal with the Islamic Republic, worth $800 million, over the construction of the Bushehr nuclear plant, for which they sold reactors and turbines.

After it was revealed in 2002 that Iran runs a secret nuclear programme, the country has come under more and more scrutiny from the international community, in particular the US and its Western allies, as many question that Iran plans to use it for peaceful means only. This concern is fuelled by Ahmadinejad’s repeated threats against Israel and some of Iran’s Arab neighbours.

Several UNSCRs have already been issued against the Islamic Republic. UNSCR 1737 was passed in December 2006 and prohibited financial and technical assistance for “Iran’s enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water and ballistic missile programmes”. Four years later, the country was still in breach of previous resolutions and failed to cooperate with the IAEA inspectors. The Security Council imposed further sanctions on the regime and again called on Teheran to completely suspend its enrichment activities.

Despite supporting some of the diplomatic manoeuvres against Iran, Russia has not significantly altered or downgraded its relationship with Teheran and is arguably in breach of the international community’s sanctions against the Islamic Republic. For instance, Putin finally agreed in 2005 to provide the Bushehr plant with Russian nuclear fuel.

The reason for Russia to maintain close ties with Iran at such a high price are threefold . Firstly, Russia and Iran perceive US hegemony and Western influences as a common threat. Both were particular concerned by the Bush administration’s attempt to expand NATO’s sphere of influence on the Balkans and the Caucasus, areas of strategic importance for both Moscow and Teheran

Secondly, Russia is struggling to contain Islamic extremism at its backdoor, especially in Chechnya, which is why Moscow needs allies in the Islamic world. In return for supporting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Islamic Republic has, at least officially, refrained from actively supporting the Chechen rebel, as any Middle Eastern government which seeks Moscow’s support must either side with their struggle against Chechen separatists or, at a minimum, not protest.

Thirdly, Russia’s alliance with Iran has been highly beneficial and proves that Moscow is prepared to risk its relationship with the West, in particular the US, for economic reasons.

The Russian- Iraq Relationship

As with Iran, economic considerations and political opposition to the US guided Russian policy toward Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. This became strongly apparent in the run up to the 2003 Iraq invasion. At the time, sanctions were crumbling and the no-fly zone over the northern and southern part of Iraq was no longer working. Furthermore, Saddam’s regime was able to smuggle prohibited items in and out of the country through its neighbouring borders.

Consequently, the US and its allies pushed for new and stronger sanctions in the UN Security Council, aimed at restoring the no fly zone over the Kurdish region and to seal off the borders to stop illegal trade. This however was strongly opposed by Russia. Moscow was the leading force in trying get sanctions lifted and Putin’s government threatened to veto any UNSCR of that kind.

As the UK’s former ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, recalled “Russia had its own direct relationship with Iraq and was talking with Iraq probably more than any other country”.  He also stated that Iraq’s debt to Russia “was in many billions of dollars resulting from the Iran/Iraq war purchases” and the country “wanted sanctions to be lifted so they could get some of their money back”. At some point, the US and UK even discussed to pay parts of the $8 billion owed to Moscow to gain the country’s support.

Other economic reasons for Russia to oppose a stronger sanction regime and the invasion of Iraq was that Saddam offered them lucrative contracts in return and Moscow wanted to preserve the cashing-in from the UN’s oil-for-food-programme.

But the country also opposed the US-led policy towards Iraq for political considerations. The reasons given by Moscow were highly dubious. While on the one hand, Putin stated that he opposed the war in Iraq because of the strong opposition of Russia’s Muslim, he never displayed much concern about their opinion on Russian policy toward Chechnya.

Another piece of evidence which suggests that the Putin administration actively tried to wage public opinion against the US is that many of the 20,000 protesters, who went on the streets against the war, were given favours in return.

Russia’s relationship with Iraq is a further example of the country’s troubled Middle East policy and unlike in case of Iran, Moscow has not gained a lot from boycotting the toppling of the Baathist regime. In fact, it can be argued that Saddam, by offering Russia lucrative contracts in return to opposition to the US, influenced Russian policy as much as vice versa, which again is an indicator that Moscow’s Middle East policy is defensive rather than offensive.

Further, with Saddam gone, Russia has lost yet another ally in the region and Putin’s decision not to support the removal of Iran’s arch-enemy, also put Russia’s relationship with Teheran under strain.

Russia’s Janus-faced Middle East Policy

Especially on the issue of Islamic extremism, Moscow’s approach has been Janus-faced. While determined to brutally crushing down those movements at home and on the northern Caucasus, Putin’s administration at the same time maintains close ties with regimes, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, which represents a similar ideology.

Although Teheran has officially refrained from condemning Russia’s policy in Chechnya, Putin is playing with the devil and Iran continues support for organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. It proves where Iran’s solidarity ultimately lies. Also, despite having been granted observer status in the Organisation of Islamic Conference, many Arab states are still publicly condemning Russia’s approach to Chechnya. Thus, in the short-term, Moscow maybe succeeds in containing the situation on the northern Caucasus with its purpose alliances in the Middle East, but in the long-term it will hardly solves the problem.

Moreover, even though Russia experienced a limited surge of influence when the US and allies where under severe pressure in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia failed to sustainably increase its influence in the region, and consequently Moscow’s Middle East policy remains defensive rather than offensive. Additionally, Russia did not effectively boycott and sabotage decisive policy decisions of the US and its Western allies, as for instance in case of Iraq. Also, with Saddam’s regime gone, Iran under tremendous pressure from the international community and Assad, another ally of Russia, on the brink in Syria, the country has to expect further backlashes.

The only of the three objectives Russia fulfilled was to enhance its economic partnerships in the region. Especially its support for Iran’s nuclear programme has brought in a lot of money for Moscow. In recent years, in particular under Putin’s leadership, Russia has also successfully intensified economic relationships with Israel and other Arab countries, which were not traditional trading partners of Russia.

In sum, Russia has failed to make priorities in the Middle East and got caught up in many conflicts of interest and policy dilemmas. Instead of focusing on specific goals, Moscow has often pursued opportunistic ends, resulting in inconsistent and ambivalent decision-making processes.

10 years on – a personal reflection

Picture: Time Magazine

On 9/11, 2001 I was at home – ill. I was watching television when the first plane crashed into the Twin Towers. It surely must have been a terrible accident, I thought. When the second plane flew into the building, minutes later, it was clear that it was not a tragic human failure but a deliberate act of terrorism.

I remember people jumping out of windows into certain death, desperately trying to escape the raging fire. I recall people covered in blood, dust and tears. It was almost as if I could feel their pain, physically, behind my television screen. It felt as if the terrorists had raped the very meaning of humanity, compassion and love.

I was only 14 years old; too young and too innocent to fully grasp the consequences of the atrocity. I could not see what possibly could have provoked so much hatred, bitterness and violence. But I nevertheless sensed that things would never be the same again and that, whatever it was, this had profoundly changed our world forever.

Ten years on, I have fully absorbed the impact 9/11 had on our way of life and things have indeed never been the same ever since.  This was not an attack on America. It was an attack on us – the free world – on everything we stand for.

On balance, the West has responded accurately and effectively. Some more than others have restlessly tried to ensure that our values are not being compromised by death-worshipping Islamic fascists.

In particular, our armed forces and, above all, those fine young men and women who have given the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan and Iraq – preserving our freedom, our democracy, our liberty – deserve praise more than anyone else.

We must stop apologising for our own position. We did not cause 9/11 and we did not give rise to the ideology and narrative represented by Al Qaida, based on the perversion of Islam. We have to be confident and prepared for a generation-long struggle. This battle is far from over but it is too fundamental to allow a defeat.

Osama Bin Laden once said that the West’s problem is to find people willing to die for our values, while his problem is to hold back people willing to die for his.

We must prove him wrong – let this be the memorial for all those innocents who died on 9/11, 2001.

Iraq: From Dictatorship to Democracy

Today, Britain finally concluded its mission in Iraq, roughly eight years after the invasion in 2003. The vast majority of troops were already pulled out in 2009, a handful however remained to help with naval training of the Iraqi army.

With hindsight, the war deeply divided the international community, the country and the Labour Party. Mistakes have been made, especially in the aftermath of the war, and it is important to acknowledge and learn from them.

176 brave British service personnel and 110,000 Iraqi civilians tragically lost their lives in the conflict – 110,176 innocent souls too many. Most of them were killed not by American and British soldiers but terrorists, the same fanatics we are fighting across the entire Middle East.

But it is worth remembering that less than ten years ago, Iraq was ruled by a brutal, genocidal dictator and his crime family, responsible for the death of almost two million people. Abduction, persecution, torture, rape and assassinations were common practices under Saddam’s reign of terror.

Despite the UN’s oil for food programme, Iraqis were starving and the country had an infant mortality rate equal to Congo with 130 per 1,000 children under the age of five. That equated to about 90,000 deaths per year. Today, the figure is down to 40.

Iraq is now a fragile yet relatively stable democracy. It has a new constitution, the first democratic one in its 80-year old history. Elementary rights such as the freedom of expression, religion and assembly are guaranteed by the constitution and generally respected in practice. The process of post-war recovery is expected to achieve annual growth of 11.7 per cent during the next five years.

Elections have taken place twice, in 2005 and 2010. International and domestic monitoring groups described them as free and fair, turn-out was extremely high (up to 75 per cent) and the government now represents people from all different religious and ethnic backgrounds. In 2008, the Iraqi parliament already passed legislation to bring Sunni Arabs back into the political process, former members of the Ba’athist party were permitted to retake their jobs, the largest Sunni bloc returned to government and six Sunni ministers joined al-Maliki’s cabinet.

John McTernan eloquently pointed out in Thursday’s Daily Telegraph that “there may be only one country in the world today where a majority – the vast majority – of the population still support the invasion of Iraq: but that country is Iraq itself.”

Taking all that into account, the Iraq war was – on balance – a success. It is something Britain should be proud not ashamed of. The removal of murderous dictators is morally sound. It would have been right in Rwanda and Bosnia, was right in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Iraq and is now right in Libya.

The narrative of the anti-Iraq war brigade has not quite turned out the way they predicted. The doctrine of humanitarian interventionism is not dead, it was not buried in the sands of Iraq and future political leaders were not demoralised by the carnage of the aftermath.

Dan Hodges was right: Libya isn’t an embarrassment for Tony Blair. It’s his validation.

You couldn’t make it up: Chomsky on Osama Bin Laden’s death

Noam Chomsky is like a matrix of intellectual antimatter. When the man puts his poison-pen to work, it consistently produces a tidal wave of extreme left-wing propagandism, anti-Americanism, anti-Semitism and genocidal relativism.

One of my favourite Chomsky remarks ever was his reaction to the death of almost 3000 completely innocent people on September 11: “For the first time in history the victims are returning the blow to the motherland.”

It is impossible to expose moral bankruptcy more unambiguously.

None of us should thus be surprised by his obnoxious comments on Osama Bin Laden’s execution.

We might ask ourselves how we would be reacting if Iraqi commandos landed at George W. Bush’s compound, assassinated him, and dumped his body in the Atlantic.

What an accurate, precise and meticulous analogy, comparing the Navy Seals to Saddam’s Ba’athist henchmen and the former President of the United States to a fanatical, mass-murdering Islamic terrorist.

As one of my friends observed:  “If you’d set out to write a parody Chomsky reaction, this is kind of exactly what it would have looked like.”

Amen to that.