Hezbollah proves EU incapable of having common Foreign & Security Policy

Bulgarian authorities confirmed last week that Iranian-backed, Lebanese Shi’ite terror-organisation Hezbollah was the architect behind the deadly bus bombing that killed five Israeli civilians and the local bus driver in Burgas last summer.

The country’s Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov declared that two of the three suicide bombers “were members of the militant wing of Hezbollah” and that data was “showing the financing and connection between Hezbollah and the two suspects.”

Despite the evidence, both Hezbollah and Iran categorically deny involvement in the attack.

Deputy Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem said Israel was directing “allegations and incitements and accusations against Hezbollah” and added that the organisation “will not submit to these pressures (…) and that the compass will remain directed towards Israel.”

A similar message was conveyed by the regime in Theran: “This has nothing to do with Iran,” Gholamreza Bageri told reporters. “We are against any form of terrorism and strongly condemn such actions.”

What makes the Burgas attack particularly explosive is the fact that it happened on European soil sparking new debate over the EU’s policy towards Hezbollah, which varies widely across the Union. The pressure from the US and Canada to ban Hezbollah once and for all is steadily growing.

Right now, the Netherlands is the only country that has Hezbollah on its official terrorist list. It allows the government to outlaw the organisation’s activities, freeze bank accounts and assets, and put suspected members under surveillance.

The UK has a more ambiguous and problematic policy, making a distinction between the organisation’s ‘political’ and ‘military’ wings, although Foreign Secretary William Hague has indicated that the government would likely back a full ban of the organisation.

Throughout the rest of Europe, Hezbollah can engage freely in political activities and fundraising.

In Germany, up to 950 are believed to operate in the country, which is regarded as a stronghold for the organisation in Europe and key to its fundraising capabilities.

Several EU countries remain in strong opposition to a potential EU ban, most notably France and the Scandinavian countries. The latter have a history of remaining neutral and opposing legislation that takes a stance against one group or another. According to Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, the EU needs to “reflect seriously on consequences of [the] Bulgarian probe naming Hezbollah as behind [the] terrorist attack.”

France, Lebanon’s former colonial power, believes that outlawing the organisation would put French lives at risk and have a negative impact on the relationship between Paris and Beirut.

So it seems highly unlikely that the Bulgarian attack will eventually lead to a significant change in the EU’s approach towards Hezbollah. To alter the current policy, a unanimous vote would be required by the 27 member states. A full and comprehensive ban is thus almost impossible to achieve. The best compromise seems to be following the British example, whereby the EU would make a distinction between Hezbollah’s political and military wing.

The self-defeating structure and decision-making processes of the EU bring out the worst of the organisation. It makes it incapable of taking decisive action and always reduces it to finding agreement on the lowest common denominator, with the result that the problem remains unsolved.

No one is satisfied with the outcome, but at least no one officially rebels against the decision. That is the EU’s modus operandi.

Such sentiments were reflected by the spokesman of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, who issued a statement in which Hezbollah was not even mentioned by name: “the terrorists who planned and carried out the Burgas attack must be brought to justice.”

But if the EU cannot even resolve a dispute over such a clear cut case, how is it supposed to deal with far more complex and controversial foreign and security policy issues in a competent way?

Hezbollah’s record leaves little doubt over the organisation’s nature and ideology, which is in clear breach of the EU’s fundamental principles.

Hezbollah is Iran’s terror proxy, a country regarded by several EU member states as the greatest current threat to peace and stability in the world, and responsible for the death of thousands of innocent civilians. The EU itself declared in 2012 that there was “clear evidence of terrorist activity” by Hezbollah.

The dichotomy of a political and military wing is misguided and dangerous. Just as much as Gerry Adams and Martin McGuiness had influence over the IRA’s military council, so has Hassan Nasrallah the ultimate power over all Hezbollah activities. Hezbollah is not a charitable, social movement. It is a terrorist organisation with global outreach, funded by pariah state Iran, which hides behind hospitals and schools to cover up its true agenda and ideology.

The trail of blood speaks for itself.

Hezbollah was responsible for the 1983 Beirut bombing that killed 58 French peacekeepers and 241 American Marines, regularly engages in deadly attacks against Israeli civilians, and supports the mass-murdering regime of Bashar al Assad in Syria.

But the EU’s incompetence to speak with one voice in the wake of a crisis has once more been exposed. All the evidence is not enough to compete with the different national policy agendas of EU member states, and to lead to an unequivocal ban of Hezbollah.

The winners are our enemies. They take advantage of such weakness, and exploit our differences. And Europe is letting them.

Syria: should the West be more proactive?

Introduction

The crisis in Syria is on-going and so is the debate about the West’s options to help end the bloodshed. Those in favour of a more pro-active policy are regularly confronted with a variety of arguments against intervention. Some of them are perfectly legitimate and rightly point at the potential risks of Western involvement. The validity of others, however, has to be questioned. In the following, four common myths will be addressed.

1) “Syria is primarily a humanitarian crisis”

The humanitarian crisis in Syria is heart-breaking. According to UN figures, 60,000 people have died since March 2011 and the actual number is likely to be much higher. Thousands are fleeing the violence across the border every day – 84,000 in December 2012 alone – bringing the total number of those displaced to around half a million.

However, as much as Syria is a humanitarian catastrophe, it is also a geo-political, strategic crisis.

Syria is not an isolated case like, for instance, Libya. It is central to holding together the Middle East, as it touches upon various, complex interests. Due to the sectarian nature of the conflict, the spill-over effects into other countries are severe.

Turkey is not only subject to repeated border violations but watches the mobilisation of Kurdish forces in northeast Syria with sheer horror. A sharp increase of terrorist attacks can be witness in Iraq with al-Qaeda exploiting the conflict to regain momentum. Baghdad, like Turkey, is equally concerned about the Kurdish factor. So far, the number of Kurds fleeing into Iraq has been relatively small but if they were to unite, they could shift the balance of power in the country and put pressure on the Turkish government.

Meanwhile, Iran is actively supporting the Assad regime and its proxy militia, Lebanese Shia terrorist group Hezbollah, is smuggling fighters and weapons into Syria. Syria’s Sunni population, in particular the Islamist fractions among the opposition, are propped up by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As such, the brutal conflict is not only pushing Syria into the humanitarian abyss but is destabilising various other countries to a dangerous degree. It is a recipe for a long-term sectarian strife, destruction, and death across the entire region that will make post-war Iraq look simple.

2) “Syria is lost to Islamic extremists”

The Islamist fractions in Syria are powerful and their influence is steadily growing. Among the 13 Islamic extremist groups are al-Qaeda jihadists, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the al-Tawheed Brigade, as well as Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers. In particular, the northern Syrian town of Aleppo has turned into one of their strongholds and in November 2012, they declared it an independent Islamic state.

The Islamists, however, were not the ones who triggered the revolution, though they profited immensely from it. How did they manage to hijack the cause?

On the one hand, the Islamic rebels are supported by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but even more importantly the moderates have been considerably weakened by the lack of outside support. As one Syrian man stated, he can understand why people turn to the extremists and shout “Allahu akbar”. “Who else has helped us?” he asks. “No one.”

While the post-Assad era is likely to be violent and chaotic, it is not too late to fix some of the damage caused.

Western help can counteract the rise of extremist ideologies. The US-led intervention in Kosovo has pushed back the spread of such ideologies, which are likely to emerge in situations of war and despair, and effectively manifested pro-Western attitudes among the predominantly Muslim population.

Assad has not fallen yet and there is still opportunity to influence, at least to a certain extent, the direction the country will take. When the time for making decisions comes, there is a strong argument for the West’s need to be in that room, rather than outside.

3) “Assad is the guardian of minorities”

A common argument in favour of Assad’s reign is that Syria’s religious minorities have so far enjoyed relative freedom and protection in the country.

It is true that most Christians and Alawites stick with Assad, an autocratic, but secular leader as they fear revenge attacks and religious oppression. They are not giving the Syrian opposition the benefit of the doubt, after what happened in Iraq, Egypt, and Lebanon.

A Christian man from Syria expressed the dilemma vividly: “If the regime goes, you can forget about Christians in Syria. […] Look what happened to the Christians of Iraq. They had to flee everywhere, while most of the churches were attacked and bombed.”

In contrast, another ethnic minority has long suffered oppression under Assad and his predecessors. The Kurds are the second largest minority in Syria and were among the first to rise up against Assad in 2004. Since then, they have engaged in anti-Assad protests and many have joined the Free Syrian Army. Nevertheless, there is also doubt among the Kurdish people about their perspectives under a new regime: “Maybe things will be worse for us.”

However, Assad is not the only source of stability and security available to Syria’s Kurds, Christians and Alawites, Druze and Ismaelites. The Syrian Support Group has developed a detailed transitional-justice plan with considerable security-guarantees to stem the danger of post-Assad sectarian violence and lawlessness in rural regions.

As a part of the plan, the Syrian opposition wants to employ carrots and sticks, like partial or full amnesty, to motivate former Assad officials to defect and initiate the process of his fall. Moreover, safe-passage will be guaranteed to Alawites who are not in Assad’s inner circle. In addition, there will also be a fund to compensate war victims and their families.

The plan was developed by a London-based legal firm called McCue & Partners, which is advising the Syrian Support Group. Hopes are that the plan will gain international support at the next Friends of Syria meeting in Italy. Washington Post journalist David Ignatius even went so far as to call the plan “the best idea advanced so far by the Syrian rebels”.

4) “There are no effective military strategies available”

“There is nothing we can do” has become the favourite mantra of the opponents of potential military intervention in Syria. The truth is that we have various options at our disposal, short of a full-scale invasion.

Firstly, we should consider arming the moderate fractions among the opposition. While such undertaking is not without risk, it is indefensible that right now everyone is receiving support but the people that are Syria’s only hope for a brighter future.

Secondly, the Patriots stationed along the Turkish-Syrian border provide us with a unique opportunity to establish a partial No-Fly-Zone. Given that Assad is increasingly killing from the air, the casualty number could be significantly reduced. Once such a zone is created and upheld, humanitarian corridors to address the civilian suffering could be established.

Contrary to what opponents of military intervention claim, Assad’s army is not nearly as strong as perceived and his capabilities greatly exaggerated. Syria’s military forces are better equipped than those of Libya under Gaddafi but the average standard of military efficiency in the Middle East, is relatively low, especially in countries where most weaponry consists of outdated Soviet-era purchases. The number of ground troops are not higher than 100,000, the navy fleet is limited in scope, the air force lacks regular maintenance and Assad has failed to get hold of 60% of his ill-trained reserves.

Thirdly, Syria is not Iraq. Not even the strongest supporters of military intervention, like Republican Senator John McCain, suggest putting boots on the ground. Furthermore, in the case of Iraq a relatively small group of defected intellectuals called for military intervention but in Syria, the animosity against the West is growing precisely because of a lack of action.

Syria, like Libya, has never been a traditional ally of us. But as a Gallup poll in the post-Gaddafi era has shown, Libyans now like Americans more than Canada and several European countries. Maybe it is time to see the revolution in Syria not only as a threat, which it clearly is, but also as an opportunity. But to turn the uprising into something more positive, it is not enough to remain on the side-line and watch as the chaos unfolds.

Top 50 Favourite Tweeters of 2012

There are too many fascinating people on Twitter to name them all but here is a list of those whose tweets I have most enjoyed in 2012. The entries appear in no particular order of relevance or importance.

Tweeps from the United States

Jeffrey Goldberg – National Correspondent, The Atlantic. One of the most reasoned, calm and sane voices

Eli Lake – Senior national security reporter for Newsweek/Daily Beast. Follow him, if you want to know the truth about Benghazi

Abe Greenwald – Senior Editor, Commentary

Ben Cohen – Contributor to Commentary, WSJ, Ha’aretz, NY Post, Jewish Ideas Daily, Fox News, JNS and Jerusalem Post

Ari Fleischer – Former White House Press Secretary under President George W. Bush. Probably the funniest guy I follow.

The Bush Center-  Official account of the George W. Bush Presidential Center

Tom Taylor - No one re-tweeted me more often. Thank you!

Condoleezza Rice – Former Secretary of State. Political queen of the universe and parallel universes

John McCain – The man who tirelessly exposes the moral bankruptcy of Obama’s foreign policy

Steven A Cook – Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

Max Boot – Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

Josh Rogin – Staff Writer,  The Cable

Jackson Diehl – Foreign Affairs columnist, The Washington Post

Ian Bremmer – President of EurasiaGroup

Shadi Hamid – Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center & Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution

Brian Stewart – Unabashed neocon

Charles Krauthammer – The man behind the ‘Bush Derangement Syndrome’

Andrew Kaczynski – Reporter for BuzzFeed Politics

Tweeps from the United Kingdom

John Rentoul – Columnist, Independent on Sunday; biographer of Tony Blair. The oracle of Westminster

Nick Cohen – Writer for the Observer, Time, Spectator and Standpoint. He affectionately calls me a ‘crazed neocon babe’

Stephen Pollard – Editor, the Jewish Chronicle

Tony Blair Office – Official account of the Former Prime Minister

Ruth Turner – CEO of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation and one of the hardest-working and most trustworthy people you will find in British politics

Mr Partisan – Writer , Commentary. In his own words: ‘I makes Newt Gingrich look like a Marxist’.

Robert Halfon – My favourite MP

Tom Harris – A fine and immensely entertaining Labour MP

Martin Bright – Political Editor of The Jewish Chronicle and Spectator blogger

Blairsupporter - I may  resigned from the Blairite attack squadron but he is still standing

Rob Marchant - Blogger and keeps sanity alive on the left

Glen OGlaza – Political Correspondent Sky News

Tim Marshall – Foreign Affairs Editor Sky News (showing his true colours at alter ego Itwitius)

Citizen Sane – His Twitter name speaks for itself: 100% sanity from the political centre

Charles Crawford – Former British Ambassador

Peter Watt – Former Labour Party General Secretary under Tony Blair

Jacob Campbell – Research fellow at the Institute for Middle Eastern democracy and Ahmadinejad hater numero uno

Ed West – Prematurely Right-wing London journalist and Daily Telegraph blogger

Sarah Pilchick‏- My Jewish princess. Plus, we survived the London School of Economics together

Mark Wallace – Political campaigner

Matthew Taylor- Chief Executive of the Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce

Gary Kent – Administrator of the All-Party Parliamentary Group the Kurdistan Region in Iraq

Ben McCcabe – It takes a brave man to wear a Rick Santorum sweater vest at the London School of Economics

 HKK G – The crème de la crème of Twitter Kurds

Matthew d’Ancona – Columnist, The Sunday Telegraph

Norman Geras – Professor Emeritus in Politics, University of Manchester

Daniel Finkelstein – Columist, The Times

Hopi Sen – Blogger

Alex Dean – Head of Public Affairs, Weber Shandwick UK

Oliver Kamm – Leader Writer, The Times. No one destroys Noam Chomsky like he does

David Aaronovitch – Columist, The Times

Heath Pritchard - Political refugee from Obamunist Seattle

Should the UK join the EU Monetary Union?

When the single currency was introduced in 1999, eleven out of the fifteen European states joined the EMU. The UK however, one of the largest economies in the Union, declined to participate. The choice of whether or not joining the Euro zone was a fiercely contested issue in Britain with the government and business circles generally in favour of joining and the conservative opposition, right wing-media, and large parts of the public equally strong against participation.

Several key economic reasons were named for both in favour of and against adopting the Euro. The parties that were supportive of joining the EMU saw the single currency as a natural and further step towards the Single European Market. They argued that it would enhance the competitiveness of the UK economy and provide sustainable growth and prosperity. Furthermore, the government embraced a pro-European policy and wanted to lead the country out of isolation into the heart of European politics.

On the contrary, the opponents of the single currency argued that the Euro would undermine British national identity by replacing the Pound, and that Britain was culturally and economically closer to US business cycles. Their strongest argument against adopting the Euro was the loss of national sovereignty in terms of monetary policy, which would have largely been coordinated by the European Central Bank. The UK would not have been able to follow an independent exchange rate policy anymore with the result that it would have been impossible to adjust interest rates in times of crisis. The UK would have lost influence over its national economic agenda, since more and more macroeconomic decisions were planned to be made in Brussels. Additionally, while fiscal policy, like tax harmonisation, was not directly linked to the EMU, opponents believed that the adoption of the single currency and deeper integration in relation to the Single Market was a clear sign for an on-going convergence process.

In 1999, the Bank of England became independent which was generally seen as a positive signal for potential membership, since it mirrored one of the criteria, outlined in the Maastricht Treaty, for joining the Euro zone. However, there was also increasingly pressure to reject membership in the long term, when for example the Euro fell steadily against the Dollar and the Pound in the same year. As a result, the “Five Economic Tests”, issued by the Treasury in 1997 and which were key economic criteria for a potential British membership, became increasingly the breaking point of the debate. The tests addressed the following questions of concern:

1. Convergence: Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?

2. Flexibility: If problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?

3. Investment: Would joining EMU create better conditions for firms making long-term decisions to invest in Britain?

4. Financial Services: What impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK’s financial services industry, particularly the City’s wholesale markets?

5. Growth, Stability and Employment: In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability and a lasting increase in jobs?

The problem with the test were that they were originally meant to be rather elastic but increasingly became rigid hurdles for adopting the currency. Consequently, when the Treasury issued its assessment in 2003, it concluded that the five tests were either not sufficiently met or answered, and as a result British membership in the monetary union not recommendable in the foreseeable future.

There is a high risk for the UK in joining the monetary union. Strong divergences such as the high probability of asymmetric shocks and a restricted openness to trade make it less likely and favourable for the UK to join the monetary union in the near future. In contrast to the EU, there is a much closer trading relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, some economists argue that convergence is a feature of countries that are already in monetary union; it is not something that takes place beforehand. The five criteria thus could only be accessed in the post-accession period. However, I believe that in the pre-union time a certain degree of convergence needs to be achieved first. This is currently not the case in the UK.

Under the given circumstance, the most likely future scenario is that the UK will not join the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) and will continue to keep its own currency as well as independent fiscal and monetary policy. There is still the question if the EU can be really regarded as an OCA. There are still limitations of the OCA criteria, especially in times of economic crisis and further EU enlargement.

Moreover, considering the latest economic and political developments, a membership appears to be almost impossible. The bankruptcy of the Greek state has led the Euro into its deepest crisis since its adoption in 1999. Furthermore, the change of government in the UK, with the Eurosceptic Conservatives now in power, has been equal to a kiss of death to a continuous and open debate about a potential EMU entry.  As Conservative Member of Parliament Alan Duncan said “The Euro would take UK only to economic fantasy land”.